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A SHOCK TO THE SYSTEM: ANALYZING THE CONFLICT
AMONG COURTS OVER WHETHER AND WHEN EXCITED
UTTERANCES MAY FOLLOW SUBSEQUENT STARTLING
OCCURRENCES IN RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES
COLIN MILLER*
INTRODUCTION
A four-year-old girl visits with her mother for the weekend and
then becomes upset at the prospect of returning to her father's house.'
After crying, she tells her mother that she was improperly touched by
her babysitter's son at her father's house.2 A mentally and physically
challenged nineteen-year-old is told by her mother that she is being
returned to her aunt's house.' She begins to cry hysterically and
eventually tells her mother that her aunt's live-in boyfriend raped her
and she fears she might be pregnant.4 In the first case, the court
reverses the lower court's decision to exclude the girl's statement,
holding that it could qualify as an excited utterance.5 In the second
case, the court allows the mother to testify about her daughter's
statements because they constitute excited utterances.' In both, the
rationale is the same - a subsequent startling occurrence can trigger
associations with the crime being prosecuted, rekindling the stress of
the original occurrence and forming the predicate for an excited
utterance.7 Each court asserts that the return of a victim to the place
where she was allegedly abused could qualify as a subsequent
* Assistant Appellate Court Attorney, New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division.
J.D., William and Mary; B.A., University of Virginia. I would like to thank my wife Zoe for her
love and support and Susan Grover for her assistance on the article.
1. In re Troy P., 842 P.2d 742, 743-44 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
2. Id. at 744.
3. Esser v. Commonwealth, 566 S.E.2d 876, 878 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).
4. Id.
5. Troy P., 842 P.2d at 747.
6. Esser, 566 S.E.2d at 879-80.
7. Id. at 879:
We see no reason, however, given the rationale for the excited utterance
exception..., why a subsequent related startling event cannot be the startling
event that produces an excited utterance about a prior event or why that excited
utterance cannot be considered for admission under the excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule.
Id.; Troy P., 842 P.2d at 747 (holding that "[c]ourts have.., admitted spontaneous utterances
made well after the event when the declarant was suddenly subjected to rekindled
excitement").
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startling occurrence, triggering associations with prior sexual abuse
and prompting excited utterances.8
A thirteen-year-old girl is allegedly sexually abused by her
mother's ex-husband.9 The next night, the girl becomes "visibly upset
at the prospect of having to return" to the apartment where the
alleged assailant resides, and she recounts the details of the sexual
abuse.'° A three-year-old girl becomes "agitated and 'panicky' at the
prospect of returning to visit" her father while staying with her step-
grandmother, crying and recounting episodes of abuse." In each
case, the court excludes admission of these statements as excited
utterances. 12 Both courts acknowledge that the victim making the
statement was indeed suffering from the stress of being returned
to the environment in which she was abused." Yet, each court re-
jects the statements as excited utterances. The former was excluded
because the victim's emotional state of stress was not continuous
between the original crime and her statement, and the latter was
excluded because the victim was not still under the original stress of
the crime when making her statements.'
4
The differences among these cases are striking. These are not
examples of courts coming to disparate factual conclusions based on
the same underlying legal framework; instead, courts appear to be
interpreting the excited utterance exception to the rule against
hearsay in fundamentally antithetical manners. While some courts
categorically require that such an utterance immediately follow the
stress caused by the underlying crime,' others allow an utterance
to follow a subsequent startling occurrence that can transpire well
8. Esser, 566 S.E.2d at 880 (admitting the girl's statements as excited utterances because
they were "made the first time she believed she was to be returned to the place where she was
assaulted and to the control of appellant, the man who had raped and sexually assaulted
her"); Troy P., 842 P.2d at 747 ("[W]e believe the imminent return of the victim to her father
could support admission of her statements as an excited utterance.").
9. State v. Lafrance, 589 A.2d 43, 44 (Me. 1991).
10. Id.
11. Mosley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Tex. App. 1997).
12. Id. at 204; Lafrance, 589 A.2d at 46.
13. Mosley, 960 S.W.2d at 204 (acknowledging that the victim's agitation at the prospect
of returning to her father "may, indeed, be genuine, and springing from the event which she
described"); Lafrance, 589 A.2d at 46 ("[IThe record shows that [the victim] was experiencing
the stress of fear over returning to her own apartment while [the assailant] was still living
there.").
14. Mosley, 960 S.W.2d at 204 ('The 'excitement' experienced by the declarant must be
continuous between the event itself and the statement describing it."); Lafrance, 589 A.2d at
46 (rejecting admission of the victim's statements because there was no evidence that she
"was still under the stress of excitement caused by [the defendant's] alleged unlawful sexual
conduct").
15. See, e.g., Mosley, 960 S.W.2d at 204; Lafrance, 589 A.2d at 46.
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after the stress from the underlying offense has subsided.16 These
differences are not limited to the unique factual situations cited
above. Courts have also admitted and excluded statements made by
victims soon after exhibiting fear of the pain of urinating 7 and after
being discovered by adults while mimicking sexual positions
'learned" from prior abuse 8 (to name the most frequently repeated
situations) based upon reasoning similar to the aforementioned
cases. Whether excited utterances can follow subsequent startling
occurrences is an issue that arises with high frequency due to rape
and sexual assault victims frequently not reporting their abuse soon
after it has occurred.' 9
In rape and sexual assault jurisprudence (and in evidence law
generally), much of the vitriol of critics has been directed against
rape shield laws and the laws allowing the admission of evidence of
prior sexual offenses against a defendant charged with rape or
sexual assault. Many critics continue to argue strenuously for the
repeal of these laws, even though they have been in effect for around
thirty2 ° and ten years, respectively,2' with no indication that they
will be overturned, despite the frequent attacks. Unfortunately,
there has been relatively little dialogue about the inconsistent
application of the excited utterance exception in rape and sexual
assault cases and its effect on rape victims' rights. Perhaps this is
because those interested in defending the rights of rape and sexual
assault victims have been busy defending these two laws against
charges of "feminist" lawmaking.22
This article will argue that emotional statements made by rape
and sexual assault victims in response to subsequent startling
occurrences, even when removed in time from the original crime,
16. See, e. g., Troy P., 842 P.2d at 747; Esser, 566 S.E.2d at 879-80.
17. See, e.g., State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d 817, 821 (Tenn. 1997) ("We agree that the
victim's painful urination was a sufficiently serious and startling event under the rule.").
18. See, e.g., W.C.L. v. People, 685 P.2d 176 (Colo. 1984).
19. Aviva Orenstein, "My God!" A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception
to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159, 200 (1997).
20. See Ellen Goodman Op-Ed., Rethinking the Rape Shield, BOSTON GLOBE, July 31,2003
(discussing how rape shield laws have been in place for approximately thirty years).
21. Federal Rules of Evidence Rules 413-15 were added as part of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320935, 108 Stat. 1796
(1994) (codified as amended in part at 18 U.S.C.S. § 921 (2005)).
22. The only articles extensively addressing the juxtaposition of the excited utterance
exception and sexual abuse cases are Orenstein, supra note 19, and Randolph N. Jonakait,
"My God!" Is This How a Feminist Analyzes Excited Utterances, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 203 (1997). Both of these articles address whether the excited utterance standards should
be applied more liberally in sexual abuse cases but do not address in any depth whether such
statements made in response to subsequent startling occurrences can qualify as excited
utterances.
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should potentially be admissible as excited utterances. Those courts
categorically excluding these statements rely on old res gestae
rationales that are unrelated to the excited utterance exception.
Section I considers the history and underpinnings of hearsay, res
gestae, and the excited utterance exception. This section delineates
why res gestae was admitted as an exception to the rules against
hearsay, why excited utterances are admissible, and how the
rationales for the two exceptions differ. It also analyzes how courts
and legislatures have altered the application of the excited utter-
ance exception for child and adult sexual assault victims. Finally, it
considers how questioning plays a role in the application of the
excited utterance exception.
Section II then considers the split among courts over whether
and when subsequent startling occurrences can form the predicates
for excited utterances. It first identifies those courts claiming that
subsequent startling occurrences can form such predicates, even
though the actual reasoning by the judges on those courts reveals
that they are relying on old res gestae rationales to automatically
exclude statements made in response to subsequent startling occur-
rences. It then looks at three frequently recurring factual scenarios
to argue that courts categorically excluding these statements are
doing so improperly, principally because of reliance on old res gestae
rationales.
I. HISTORY AND UNDERPINNINGS OF HEARSAY, RES GESTAE, AND
THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION
A. A General Introduction to Hearsay
"My daughter told me that her uncle touched her private parts."
"Someone ran out from the alley and said that a woman was being
raped." "A month after it happened, I told my mother that the
babysitter sexually assaulted me."2 Under both the Federal Rules
of Evidence and state evidence codes, all three of these statements
constitute hearsay and thus cannot be introduced at trial to prove
the truth of the matter asserted (i.e. that the uncle did touch the
daughter inappropriately).24 Hearsay is an out-of-court statement
that a party seeks to introduce at trial to prove that the content of
the statement was true." Under evidence law generally, the trier of
23. These are examples of the types of statements that are considered hearsay under the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
24. FED. R. EVID. 802.
25. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
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fact determines the weight to give in-court testimony based on the
"perception, memory, and narration" of the witness.26 Legislators
drafted evidence codes to exclude hearsay from courtrooms because
it lacks "the following characteristics: assurances of reliability
stemming from an in-court oath, the ability of the fact finder to
observe the witness's demeanor, the possibility of prosecuting the
declarant [the person making the out-of-court statement] for perjury,
and, most importantly, the opportunity for cross-examination."27
Essentially, hearsay evidence is inadmissible because the trier of fact
cannot properly judge the "perception, memory, and narration" of the
declarant at the time she made the out-of-court statement.28
Federal Rule of Evidence 803 and similar state evidence code
provisions provide exceptions to the rule against hearsay, allowing
the admission of out-of-court statements for the truth of the matter
asserted when "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness"
accompany the'statement, making in-court testimony unnecessary.29
One of these exceptions is Federal Rule 803(2) (and similar state
evidence code provisions), allowing for the admission of excited
utterances. 3° Before considering what "circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness" accompanying excited utterances make in-court
testimony unnecessary, it is important to consider res gestae, the
exception which eventually spawned the excited utterance exception.
B. The Birth and Death of Res Gestae
Beginning in the early nineteenth century, courts began
recognizing the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule.31 Under the
res gestae exception, a statement was admissible if it was 'literally
... so closely connected to [the] occurrence or event in both time and
substance as to be part of the happening. 32 According to Professor
John Henry Wigmore, the exception is slightly more liberal:
"statements which would otherwise be inadmissible as hearsay may
be admitted if they closely accompany material acts or situations. 33
26. FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's note.
27. Orenstein, supra note 19, at 166 (internal citations omitted).
28. FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's note.
29. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note.
30. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
31. See United States v. Rouse, 452 F.2d 311, 313 n.3 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[Res gestae] was
relied upon widely in 19th century case law."); Orenstein, supra note 19, at 168 ("Courts
began to employ the term [res gestae] in the early 1800s . ").
32. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1305 (6th ed. 1990).
33. Rouse, 452 F.2d at 313 (construing 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1746, 1747 (3d ed. 1940));
see also, Keefe v. State, 72 P.2d 425, 427 (Ariz. 1937) ('The phrase 'res gestae' means literally
'the thing done."').
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Courts allowed these statements to be admitted despite the rule
against hearsay because they believed that the statements consti-
tuted "the automatic and undesigned incidents of the particular act
"314in issue ....
Under the res gestae exception, statements were admitted only
because they were a "continuing part of the transaction," the transac-
tion being the original event prompting the statement.3 5 Thus, for a
statement to be admissible as res gestae, it had "to 'explain, elucidate,
or in some way characterize [the] event."'36 Essentially, a statement
had to relate directly to the event which immediately preceded it in
order to constitute res gestae.37
Courts and scholars have concluded that what was generally
referred to as res gestae in fact encompasses four distinct hearsay
exceptions: "(1) declarations of present bodily condition, (2) declara-
tions of present mental state and emotions, (3) excited utterances,
and (4) declarations of present sense-impressions. 38 As a result, the
phrase res gestae has fallen out of favor,39 primarily because courts
using this term can confuse evidentiary issues. Whereas res gestae
is an "umbrella term cover[ing] a wide variety of analytically
distinct rationales, 4 ° individual hearsay exceptions are based on
narrower principles. Thus, courts using the term res gestae, rather
than specifically considering one of the four distinct hearsay
exceptions it spawned, may lose sight of the purpose for the distinct
exception. As a result, courts may require a statement to comply
with one of the rationales which is the basis for another hearsay
exception, but not the one at issue.4'
34. Keefe, 72 P.2d at 427.
35. Bayne v. State, 632 A.2d 476, 484 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993).
36. State v. Chapin, 826 P.2d 194, 198 (Wash. 1992) (quoting Beck v. Dye, 92 P.2d 1113
(Wash. 1939)).
37. Id.
38. Rouse, 452 F.2d at 313 n.3. Other courts have been less helpful in dividing res gestae
into two categories: "spontaneous exclamations" and "verbal acts." Keefe, 72 P.2d at 427.
39. Rouse, 452 F.2d at 313 n.3 ("Use of the term res gestae is now somewhat archaic.");
Bayne, 632 A.2d. at 484 ('Whatever could be analyzed under one or another of the forms of
res gestae can now be analyzed more clearly in a water-tight compartment of its own. The
phrase res gestae had its day but that day is done."); State v. Carpenter, 773 S.W.2d 1, 9
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1989) ("This court prefers to avoid the murky concept of res gestae.").
40. Moore v. State, 338 A.2d 344, 346 n.1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) ("In this case, we will
not rely upon the undifferentiated phrase res gestae, because that umbrella term covers a wide
variety of analytically distinct rationales, including excited utterances .... "); Cassidy v. State,
536 A.2d 666, 671 n.4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (citing Moore, 338 A.2d at 346 n.1). See also
Carpenter, 773 S.W.2d at 9.
41. Bayne, 632 A.2d at 483-84 ("There has been such a confounding of ideas, and such
profuse and indiscriminate use of the shibboleth res gestae, that it is difficult to disentangle
the real basis for the principle involved."); Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 303 N.E.2d 338,
346 (Mass. 1973):
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There are two major problems when courts attempt to admit a
potential excited utterance under old res gestae rationales instead
of analyzing it as an excited utterance. First, they tend to require
that the statement be a "continuing part of the transaction," a
requirement for res gestae but not for excited utterances.42 Second,
they require that the statement "elucidate, explain, or... character-
ize the [startling] event."43 While it is somewhat unclear to what
extent an excited utterance must relate to the startling occurrence,
it is almost universally accepted that the relationship need not be
as close as the relationship required under the res gestae
exception.4 The advisory committee notes to the Federal Rules of
Evidence indicate that, while the present sense impression excep-
tion (like the res gestae exception) only applies when the statement
explains the occurrence it follows, an excited utterance "need only
'relate' to the startling event or condition, thus affording a broader
scope of subject matter coverage."45 Courts generally have concurred
that the "elucidation" requirement of the res gestae exception "is not
a part of [the excited utterance exception]."46
C. The Excited Utterance Exception
1. Foundations of the Excited Utterance Exception
As noted, courts and scholars began to break down res gestae
into distinct hearsay exceptions, including the excited utterance
The phrase 'res gestae' has long been not only entirely useless, but even
positively harmful. It is useless, because every rule of Evidence to which it has
ever been applied exists as a part of some other well-established principle and
can be explained in the terms of that principle. It is harmful, because by its
ambiguity it invites the confusion of one rule with another and thus creates
uncertainty as to the limitations of both. It ought therefore wholly to be
repudiated, as a vicious element in our legal phraseology.
42. Bayne, 632 A.2d at 484 ('The otherwise independent excited utterance exception has
generally been included under the umbrella of res gestae .... This has created the improper
perception that an excited utterance must be a 'continuing part of the transaction."').
43. State v. Chapin, 826 P.2d 194, 198 (Wash. 1992) (quoting Beck v. Dye, 92 P.2d 1113
(Wash. 1939)) ("Under the res gestae rule, which is the common law rule from which [the
excited utterance exception] was derived, the utterance also had to 'explain, elucidate, or in
some way characterize [the] event."').
44. See, e.g., id. ("For purposes of 803(a)(2), an utterance may 'relate to' the startling event
even though it does not explain, elucidate, or in any way characterize the event. Any
utterance that may reasonably be viewed as having been about, connected with, or elicited by
the startling event meets this requirement.").
45. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note.
46. Chapin, 826 P.2d at 198.
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exception.47 Looking at res gestae and prior case law,48 Professor
John Henry Wigmore deduced the existence of the excited utterance
exception based on his theory that statements made by an individ-
ual while controlled by stress tend to be sincere. 49 As many scholars
have noted, courts admitted res gestae statements primarily because
they were uttered contemporaneously with key occurrences, making
them a continuing part of the transaction and likely to be truthful.5 °
Wigmore decided that statements made spontaneously while
under the stress of startling occurrences are just as reliable as
statements made contemporaneously with those events.51 With res
gestae, the essential question is whether the statement was made at
the same time as the key occurrence; for excited utterances to be
admissible, they must be made while the declarant is still controlled
by the stress of that occurrence.52 Because the stress associated with
an occurrence is likely to last significantly longer than the occur-
rence itself, the time requirements for the excited utterance
exception are concomitantly more liberal than the time require-
ments for res gestae.53
The central theory behind the excited utterance exception is
that startling events and conditions cause a certain level of stress
in an individual. While the individual is controlled by the stress
caused by such an event or condition, her mind is completely focused
on the occurrence, and she is unable to use her reflective capacity to
lie.54 More specifically, the theory is that the individual is so
47. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
48. See WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1747, at 196 (James K. Chadbourn ed. 1978).
49. Moore v. State, 338 A.2d 344, 348 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) ("From the mists of res
gestae there has emerged, under Wigmore's discerning analysis, an exception to the hearsay
rule for statements uttered under stress of excitement produced by a startling event and made
before the declarant has had time or opportunity to reflect or contrive."') (internal citations
omitted).
50. Id. ("[C]ontemporaneousness rather than spontaneity was emphasized, although the
latter was clearly recognized as highly important.") (internal citations omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id. ("[E]xcitement flowing from a startling event is the key requirement now.")
(internal citation omitted).
53. Id.
54. See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 774 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Mass. 2000) ("We next consider
whether the declarant displayed a degree of excitement sufficient to conclude that her
statement was a spontaneous reaction to the exciting event, rather than the product of
reflective thought .. "); see also In re Troy P., 842 P.2d 742, 746 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) ("The
assumption underlying the excited utterance exception is that the utterance is 'precipitated
by an external startling event [and] will be bereft of the reflective capacity essential for
fabrication."') (internal citations omitted); Moore, 338 A.2d at 347:
This general principle is based on the experience that, under certain external
circumstances of physical shock, a stress of nervous excitement maybe produced
which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the
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consumed by the stress of the startling occurrence that she is unable
to act to promote her own self-interest.55 The necessary principle
underlying this theory is that people's instinct is to tell the truth
and that it is only when they begin to reflect on an occurrence that
they begin to twist or create facts for their own benefit.5"
In a sense, courts admit excited utterances because they are
involuntary reactions to the stress of a startling occurrence, rather
than anything conscious and thus subject to manipulation by the
speaker.57 As some courts have put it, excited utterances are reliable
because they are "the event speaking through the person and not
the person speaking about the event."5 " While many critics have
attacked the underpinnings of this exception by claiming, for in-
stance, that stress distorts memory, the excited utterance exception
remains viable under both the Federal Rules of Evidence and state
evidence codes.59
Although the rationale for the excited utterance exception is
important, the elements of res gestae that are not a part of the
excited utterance exception are perhaps more important. As noted,6"
the key to excited utterances is that they are made spontaneously
while under the stress of a startling occurrence; there is no need
that they be contemporaneous with the occurrence itself.6 Also,
unlike some of the other exceptions derived from res gestae, excited
utterances do not derive their reliability from the fact that the
startling event is fresh in the memory of the declarant." In fact,
only a few sources have even mentioned this factor as having any
utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual
sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock. (internal
citations omitted).
55. Moore, 338 A.2d at 347-48 ("Since this utterance is made under the immediate and
uncontrolled domination of the senses, and during the brief period when considerations of self-
interest could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the utterance may
be taken as particularly trustworthy .. ") (internal citations omitted).
56. State v. Padilla, 329 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982) ('The underlying basis for
this exception is that people instinctively tell the truth, but when they have time to stop and
think, they may lie.").
57. Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex. App. 1999) ('CThis exception is founded on
the belief that statements made as a result of a startling event or condition are involuntary
and do not allow the declarant an adequate opportunity to fabricate, thereby ensuring enough
trustworthiness to fall outside the hearsay exception.").
58. First Southwest Lloyds Ins. Co. v. MacDowell, 769 S.W.2d 954, 959 (Tex. App. 1989).
59. FED. R. EVID. 803(2); see, e.g., TENN. R. EVID. § 803(2).
60. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
61. See United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1017 (2nd Cir. 1990) ("An excited utterance
need not be contemporaneous with the startling event to be admissible under rule 803(2).").
62. State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d 817, 819-20 (Tenn. 1997) ("Second, ordinarily the
statement is made while the memory of the event is still fresh in the declarant's mind. This
means that the out-of-court statement about an event may be more accurate than a much
later in-court description of it.").
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impact on the admissibility of excited utterances. And even when
freshness has been mentioned, it has been in cases where courts
have admitted excited utterances made after subsequent startling
occurrences removed in time from the underlying offense.6"
2. Elements of the Excited Utterance Exception
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence and most state codes of
evidence, in determining whether a statement qualifies as an
excited utterance, courts must look at whether (1) a startling event
or condition occurred; (2) the declarant made a statement while still
under the stress of that startling event or condition; and (3) the
statement relates to the startling event or condition.' Some courts,
however, have held that the admissibility of an excited utterance is
judged only under the first two elements; as long as a statement is
made while under the stress of a startling occurrence, it is irrele-
vant whether the statement relates to the event or explains it.65
Other courts have similarly held that the third element should
never be applied to exclude a statement as failing to meet the admis-
sibility test for excited utterances.' According to these courts, "the
third element, mechanically and narrowly construed, is a spurious
63. Id. at 819-21 (stating that one of the rationales for the excited utterance exception is
that the occurrence "is still fresh in the declarant's mind," yet admitting statements made
possibly twenty-four hours or more after the underlying offense); Moore v. State, 338 A.2d
344, 349 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (citing a source stating that excited utterances avoid the
"dangers of faulty recollection," but admitting statements made "within hours" after the
underlying offense).
64. Murphy Auto Parts Co. v. Ball, 249 F.2d 508, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1957):
A majority of decided cases and authorities appear to require the presence of
three elements in order for an out of court statement to qualify as an excited
utterance or spontaneous declaration. These are (a) an exciting event (b) an
utterance prompted by the exciting event without time to reflect, [i.e.],
dominated by the nervous excitement of the event, and (c) the utterance must
explain or illuminate the exciting event.
65. See, e.g., Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 947 (4th Cir. 1988) ("To qualify as an
excited utterance, the declarant must (1) have experienced a startling event or condition and
(2) reacted while under the stress or excitement of that event and not from reflection and
fabrication."); People v. Dement, 661 P.2d 675, 679 n.2 (Colo. 1983) (noting that "[s]ome courts
have also required that the substance of the assertion relate to the startling event").
66. See Ball, 249 F.2d at 511 ("The test for receiving the utterance, therefore, should be
whether it meets the first two requirements of a spontaneous declaration or excited utterance
referred to earlier."); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 774 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Mass. 2002):
Those cases tend to suggest that there is. a third aspect to the test of
admissibility. To the contrary, the nexus between the statement and the event
that produced it is but one of many factors to consider in determining whether
the declarant was, in fact, under the sway of the exciting event when she made
the statement.
See also Bayne v. State, 632 A.2d 476, 486 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993).
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element, and . . . reliability of the utterance is not inflexibly
dependent upon the subject matter of the utterance."67 Instead,
when a startling occurrence prompts a declarant to make state-
ments unrelated to the occurrence, indirectly related to that
occurrence, or related to some prior occurrence, the court should
note that the statement could "take on a reflective quality and must
be more carefully scrutinized with respect to the second element,
that of true spontaneity."6 Other courts have taken more of a
middle ground, holding that there is a third element but that it can
be satisfied as long as the statement relates broadly to the circum-
stances surrounding the occurrence.69
In Bondurant v. State, the appellant allegedly murdered his
live-in girlfriend's lover on July 13, 1994.70 On July 16th, the
appellant told his girlfriend that he was going back to their home to
commit suicide and threatened that if she told anyone he would pin
the murder on her.71 After the appellant left, his girlfriend made
statements to witnesses "concerning the appellant's suicide plans,
the murder of [the victim], and fear for her own life."72 The court
admitted her entire statement, including the portions of the
statement dealing with the murder even though these statements
did not relate directly to the appellant's threats on July 16th.73 The
court reasoned that the suicidal statement and threat by the
appellant were prompted by the murder three days earlier and,
because these events were interwoven, the declarant's statements
about the murder explained the "startling conduct on July 16[th].'
Even courts that interpret the third element more strictly
recognize that it is more liberal than the similar requirement under
67. Ball, 249 F.2d at 511.
68. Bayne, 632 A.2d at 486; see also Santiago, 774 N.E.2d at 148:
In cases, such as this, where the startling event elicits a statement concerning
some prior event, a judge may examine the nexus between the startling event,
the excited utterance generated by it, and the prior event about which the
declarant comments to determine whether the statement was made without
reflection.
69. Bondurant v. State, 956 S.W.2d 762, 766 (Tex. App. 1997) ("While the third prong of
the test requires the statement to be related to the startling event, it may also relate to the
circumstances surrounding the event. The requirement that the statements must relate to the
startling event has been liberally interpreted.").
70. Id. at 763-64.
71. Id. at 764.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 766 ("[T]he fact that portions of the spontaneous utterance relate to an event
prior to the startling event, does not make those portions of the utterance inadmissible.").
74. Id.
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res gestae.5 These courts recognize that, under the excited utterance
exception, there is no requirement that the statement "explain,
elucidate, or in any way characterize the event."76 Instead, a poten-
tial excited utterance which "may reasonably be viewed as having
been about, connected with, or elicited by the startling event meets
this requirement."77
At the same time, some courts have held that the first element
need not be satisfied or at least that the first element is not inde-
pendent from the second element.7" Many courts do not question
whether the underlying event or condition was sufficiently startling.
The first element is satisfied if the statement made by the declarant
indicates that the occurrence was startling to her.79 For example, in
People v. Franklin, the court determined that a surgical procedure
was unquestionably startling based on the declarant's description
of the procedures done by the doctor, even without reference to the
event itself.80 Other courts have phrased it slightly differently,
holding that "[t]he appearance, behavior and condition of the
declarant may establish that a startling event occurred."8 " Thus, one
court determined that a worker's discovery of mail fraud by a co-
worker was startling, not based on the event itself, but on the fact
that an observer stated that the declarant "was not normally an
excitable person and she had never before seen her so excited."82
These rulings comport with a general proposition in excited
utterance jurisprudence that the determination of whether an
occurrence is startling is subjective, not objective.83 Under this
proposition, courts must look at the effect of the occurrence on the
declarant and not at the inherent qualities of the occurrence.' Thus,
most courts have held that certain occurrences may be startling to
children even though the same occurrence would not be startling to
most adults.85
75. State v. Chapin, 826 P.2d 194, 198 (Wash. 1992).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 1986); see also, W.C.L.
v. People, 685 P.2d 176, 179 (Colo. 1984).
79. People v. Franklin, 683 P.2d 775, 781 (Colo. 1984) ("Independent proof of an exciting
event is not always necessary; the declaration itself may be sufficient proof of such an event.").
80. Id. at 781.
81. Moore, 791 F.2d at 570.
82. Id. at 571.
83. Id. at 571 n.2 (rejecting the argument that a startling occurrence "must be one that
the trier of fact can objectively perceive as one, such as a sudden fall or an automobile
accident").
84. Id.
85. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
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At the same time, some courts have looked at the first element
with a higher level of scrutiny.86 Although WC.L. v. People was
decided by the same court as Franklin later in the same year, and
although the court cited the general rule that "the sufficiency of the
event or occurrence to qualify as the 'startling event' . . . is not
questioned," the court decided to question whether the event it was
considering was, in fact, startling.8 7 In WC.L., a three-year-old girl
and her six-year-old nephew were undressing to bathe when the
girl "spread her legs[] and said, 'Get me.' ' 8 The children's aunt, who
was preparing them for their baths, then "spoke the victim's name
and asked what she was doing in a tone that apparently startled
the child. ' 9 Yet, despite the fact that the event was "apparently
startl[ing]," the court relied on a case from another jurisdiction to
hold that the event was not, in fact, startling.9"
Further, courts have come to different conclusions as to the
application of the excited utterance elements. Some courts strictly
require that all three elements must be met for a statement to be
admitted as an excited utterance. 91 Others hold that admissibility
is determined by looking at the combined effect of the two or three
elements.92 According to these courts, the second factor is the critical
factor.93 Essentially, when the proponent can show that the
statement was made while under the stress of a startling occur-
rence, there is a strong suggestion that there was, in fact, a startling
86. See, e.g., W.C.L. v. People, 685 P.2d 176 (Colo. 1984).
87. Id. at 179.
88. Id. at 177.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 180 (construing Keefe v. State, 72 P.2d 425 (Ariz. 1937)). While the court also
held that the child's statements lacked other indicia of reliability, it made clear that this
determination was separate from its determination of whether the event was startling. See
id. ("Even were we to conclude that the aunt's reaction to the child's suggestive gesture was
a startling event sufficient to meet the first requirement of the excited utterance exception,
we would also need to consider whether the child's statements were spontaneous under the
second requirement.").
91. See, e.g., Glover v. State, 102 S.W.3d 754, 764-65 (Tex. App. 2002) (excluding a
statement that met two of the three excited utterance elements, despite stating that
admissibility is based on the combined effect of the three factors).
92. See Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex. App. 1999); Bondurant v. State, 956
S.W.2d 762, 765 (Tex. App. 1997) ('CThe focus of the inquiry is whether the cumulative effect
of the three requisites is sufficient to show the reliability of the statement.").
93. See Couchman, 3 S.W.3d at 159 ("Although the other factors are relevant, the critical
issue is whether the declarant made the statement while dominated by the emotion arising
from a startling event or condition."); Bondurant, 956 S.W.2d at 765 ("The critical factor,
however, is whether the declarant made the statement while dominated by the emotion
arising from a startling event or condition.").
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occurrence and that the statement very likely related to that event,
or at least was prompted by it.
94
A few courts, such as the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and
Eighth Circuits, have also explicitly set out specific standards to
consider when applying the excited utterance exception.95 These
factors, which to an extent are at least implicitly considered by many
other courts, are: "(1) [tlhe lapse of time between the event and the
declarations; (2) the age of the declarant; (3) the physical and mental
state of the declarant; (4) the characteristics of the event; and (5) the
subject matter of the statements."96
Most courts consider the first standard, the lapse of time, at
least partially in determining whether a declarant's utterance was
made while still under the stress of the startling occurrence.97 Still,
most courts have held that the lapse of a certain amount of time is
not dispositive of admissibility.9" As will -be expounded upon more
fully in infra section I.C.3.a., consistent with the second standard,
most courts are more lenient in admitting the excited utterances of
children, primarily because children lack the capacity to fabricate
relative to adults.99
When courts determine whether a declarant is still startled
when making a statement, they must consider her physical and
mental state, as is done under the third standard."' Finally, the
fourth and fifth standards codify a basic principle of excited
utterance jurisprudence: the more startling the occurrence, and thus
the more disturbing the subject matter of the statement, the more
likely courts are to admit excited utterances further removed in
time from the startling occurrence. 1 1 Most would agree that rape
94. State v. Chapin, 826 P.2d 194, 198 (Wash. 1992).
95. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 947 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Iron Shell, 633
F.2d 77, 85-86 (8th Cir. 1980).
96. Foretich, 846 F.2d at 947; see also Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 85-86.
97. In re Ne-kia S., 566 A.2d 392, 394 (R.I. 1989) ("In determining whether Ne-kia and
Levi were 'under the stress of excitement' when they made statements to Russo, we are not
unmindful that there was a significant time lapse between the last alleged incident of abuse
and the statements made to Russo by the children.").
98. Gross v. Greer, 773 F.2d 116, 119-20 (7th Cir. 1985) ("It is well-established that the
lapse of time between the startling event and the out-of-court statement, although relevant,
is not dispositive in the application of the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule.").
99. See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 154-55 (Tex. App. 2001) ('The trial court
could reasonably have found that the victim's statement to Aguirre 'relat[ed] to a startling
event or condition,' that being the 'startling event' of the victim sustaining the injury or the
'startling condition' of the pain the victim suffered when her coat was removed, and that the
victim was still under the physical and emotional 'stress of the excitement caused by the event
or condition' when she made the statement to Aguirre."(alteration in original)).
101. See, e.g., Lieberenz v. State, 717 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (admitting an
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and sexual assaults are among the most devastating crimes with
survivors, prompting harrowing statements about the event by
traumatized victims. Interestingly, however, while most courts
analyze excited utterances under the logic of these last three
standards, as will be discussed in infra section I.C.3.b., few have
extended the time frame for excited utterances relating to rapes and
sexual assaults either generally or under the facts before them." 2
These differences make it clear that courts in different states
and circuits are interpreting and applying the excited utterance
exception in widely disparate manners. It is clear that when even
the same court in the same year comes to opposite conclusions about
how to apply the exception, clarification of the exception's standards
is necessary.0 3 This article, however, will not attempt to resolve the
dispute over how to apply the excited utterance exception. Instead,
the article will assume that the court applying the exception
requires that all three elements be fulfilled, with the third element
being less demanding than the similar requirement for res gestae
but still applicable.
3. Loosening of the Excited Utterance Exception
a. Applying the Excited Utterance Exception More
Leniently for Child Sexual Abuse Victims
From the time that Wigmore created the excited utterance
exception until the 1980s, most courts applied the excited utterance
elements with uniform strictness, whether the statements were
made by adults or children.0 4 In the 1980s, however, many sources
began criticizing the courts for applying the elements of the excited
utterance exception indiscriminately, claiming that they should be
applied more liberally when the declarant was a child.0 5 Based on
these criticisms, many courts began to acknowledge that they
should apply the elements more liberally to the statements of
children while some states began enacting legislation explicitly
changing the rules governing admission of excited utterances or
similar statements by children.
excited utterance made hours after a rape because "the greater the stress caused by the
startling event .... the longer the effects of the stress may last").
102. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., People v. Franklin, 683 P.2d 775 (Colo. 1984).
105. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 947 (4th Cir. 1988) ("Indeed, much criticism has
been directed at courts which place undue emphasis on the spontaneity requirement in child
sexual abuse cases.").
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i. Judicial Loosening of the Exception for Child Sexual
Abuse Victims
Most courts now recognize that the typical standards for
admissibility are loosened when potential excited utterances are
made by children, especially in sexual abuse cases.' °6 This is based
on several factors. First, courts generally have recognized that
children tend to process stress differently than adults. °7 On the one
hand, children may not initially understand that sexual abuse is
wrong, either leading to: a) delayed, emotional reporting when the
child finally understands the nature of the abuse, or b) more casual
reporting by a child who never comes to understand that the abuse
was wrong.' This is especially the case when a child is abused by
a trusted family member who assures the child that nothing wrong
is being done.'0 9 Also, children tend to suffer stress as the result of
sexual abuse for longer periods of time than do adults."0
Even when children do understand that sexual abuse is wrong,
they may delay in reporting it because of confusion, guilt, and fear."'
Children are also likely to repress these incidents before fully
106. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Crawford, 629 N.E.2d 1332, 1334 (Mass. 1994)
("Particularly when the declarant is a young child who remains in the company of the alleged
perpetrator after a traumatic event, precise contemporaneousness is not required."); State v.
Creighton, 462 A.2d 980, 982 (R.I. 1983) ("Generally speaking, a less demanding time
requirement is necessary in sexual-offense cases, particularly when the victim is a child of
tender years.").
107. See In re Troy P., 842 P.2d 742, 747 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) ("In situations such as that
at bar, many courts have also considered the likelihood that children react to and relate
traumatic events somewhat differently than adults.").
108. Foretich, 846 F.2d at 947 ("It has been argued that children do not necessarily
understand sexual contact by adults to be shocking ...."); Cassidy v. State, 536 A.2d 666, 676
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (internal citations omitted):
[Mlost children do not view a sexual episode as shocking or even as particularly
unusual. Children thus often do not recount the event with the shock or emotion
required under the exception. Children are simply not as highly sexualized or
moralized as adults. They may not know what has happened to them is wrong.
109. Foretich, 846 F.2d at 947 (holding that children are particularly unable to understand
sexual abuse as wrongful when the perpetrator "is a parental figure from whom the child
desires love and affection"); Cassidy, 536 A.2d at 676 (quoting Judy Yun, Note, A
Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COL. L. REV.
1745, 1756-57 (1983) ('This may be especially true if the child has been involved in an
incestuous relationship. A parental imprimatur on the entire situation may often cause the
child to view everything as normal ....")).
110. State v. Taylor, 704 P.2d 443, 454 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that "children usually
suffer prolonged stress" after sexual abuse).
111. Foretich, 846 F.2d at 947 (citing Yun, supra note 109, at 1757) ("Even if the child is
aware of the nature of the abuse, significant delays in reporting this abuse may occur because
of confusion, guilt, and fear on the part of the child.").
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experiencing the stress from them. 112 Further, children lack the
capacity to fabricate, at least relative to adults. 113 This is especially
true in sexual abuse cases, where it is unlikely that children possess
the detailed knowledge of sexual intercourse to be able to create a
believable story about it." 4
Courts also look at the unique circumstances of child sexual
abuse victims in applying the excited utterance elements more
liberally. They often note how children will not report sexual abuse
while still in the company of the alleged perpetrator and thus courts
often admit reports made by children at their first opportunity
outside the presence of the perpetrator, even if made hours or days
after the assault."5 Many courts, when admitting delayed reports
by children, have also noted that children are unlikely to report
such incidents to anyone except a trusted family member." 6
Courts also recognize that some events or conditions may be
startling to children even if they would not be startling to adults." 7
Thus, in Couchman v. State, the court admitted a four-year-old
112. Taylor, 704 P.2d at 454 ("[I]nterrogation will not defeat the characterization of a
statement of a child as an excited utterance because of the tendency of children to repress
these incidents."); State v. Padilla, 329 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Wis. 1982) ("[A] child is apt to
repress the incident.").
113. Gross v. Greer, 773 F.2d 116, 120 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that the victim's young age
"render[ed] it improbable that her utterance was deliberate and its effect premeditated");
People in Interest of O.E.P., 654 P.2d 312, 318 (Colo. 1982) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803(2)
advisory committee's note) ("The element of trustworthiness underscoring the excited
utterance exception, particularly in the case of young children, finds its source primarily in
'the lack of capacity to fabricate rather than the lack of time to fabricate."'); Taylor, 704 P.2d
at 454 (holding that children "do not consciously lie or fabricate these type[s of] incidents");
Padilla, 329 N.W.2d at 266 ("[The characteristics of young children work to produce
declarations 'free of conscious fabrication' for a longer period after the incident than with
adults. It is unlikely a young child will review the incident and calculate the effect of the
statement.").
114. Foretich, 846 F.2d at 948 (internal citation omitted) ("[I]t is virtually inconceivable
that a child of this age would have either the extensive knowledge of sexual activities or the
desire to lie about sexual abuse that would be required to fabricate a story such as the one
told by Hilary.").
115. Id. at 947 ("[C]ourts must also be cognizant of the child's first real opportunity to
report the incident."); see also Commonwealth v. Crawford, 629 N.E.2d 1332, 1334 (Mass.
1994) ("Particularly when the declarant is a young child who remains in the company of the
alleged perpetrator after a traumatic event, precise contemporaneousness is not required.");
People v. Sandoval, 709 P.2d 90, 92 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) ("Moreover, given the fact that the
victim told Kim about the incident at the first opportunity she had outside the defendant's
presence, we perceive no error in the submission by the trial court of an instruction regarding
prompt outcry."); United States v. Donaldson, 58 M.J. 477, 484 (CAAF 2003) ("[C]ourts have
been more flexible in cases in which the declarant is young, particularly where the statement
was made during the child's first opportunity alone with a trusted adult.").
116. Padilla, 329 N.W.2d at 266 ("[I]t is often unlikely that a child will report this kind of
highly stressful incident to anyone but the mother.").
117. Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex. App. 1999).
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child's report of a sexual assault made after becoming startled by a
burning sensation when she was urinating, noting that the same
condition may not have been startling to an adult victim."' Some
courts have even held that it is in the interests of justice to admit
children's reports of sexual abuse as excited utterances even when
the elements of that exception are not literally fulfilled."9
At the same time, not every court is persuaded to apply the
excited utterance elements more liberally to the statements of
children. In State v. Taylor, the court acknowledged all of the above
factors as making a child's statements more reliable, yet concluded
that, "[i]f there are special reliability characteristics inherent in the
statements of children, they should be analyzed under Evid.Rule
[sic] 803(24), [the federal catch-all] recognizing them for what they
are."120
A few courts have also held that this loosening of the excited
utterance elements for child victims has .'virtually destroyed the
integrity of the exception, stretching it far beyond its traditional
bounds, and creating much uncertainty in its application. 7'121
Meanwhile, some courts continue to apply the excited utterance
elements uniformly for adults and children without even mentioning
the precedent holding in the alternative. In State v. Walton, a six-
year-old girl was allegedly sexually assaulted by her babysitter's
father and reported the incident to her mother two days later after
stating that she 'had a black mark on her heart." 122 The court
refused to admit the statement as an excited utterance because of
the lapse in time between the event and the statement without
using any language to acknowledge the precedent loosening
application of the elements in the case of child sexual abuse
victims. 2
3
118. Id. ("Undoubtedly, some events or conditions that may not be startling to an adult may
be overwhelming for a child. It would be reasonable to infer that a four-year-old child would
be scared and upset by a burning sensation in her female sexual organ.").
119. Foretich, 846 F.2d at 948 (quoting United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1204) ('The
interests of justice were served by admitting the declaration of this child, who was the victim
of a sexual assault, and far too young to appreciate the implications of that assault.").
120. 704 P.2d 443, 454.
121. Cassidy v. State, 536 A.2d 666, 676 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (quoting Yun, supra note
109, at 1759).
122. 432 A.2d 1275, 1277 (Me. 1981).
123. The court did state generally that it "decine[d] to broaden what has been a narrow
exception to the hearsay rule, particularly in an area so fraught with danger to our conception
of a fair trial." Id. at 1277-78. It is unclear whether this language was meant to apply to the
precedent loosening application of the excited utterance elements for child victims or whether
it was a more general indictment of judicial activism.
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ii. Legislative Loosening of the Exception for Child
Sexual Abuse Victims
Under the Texas Criminal Code, statements made by sexual
assault victims twelve years of age or younger that do not meet the
excited utterance elements may be admitted under its "outcry"
provision. 12 Courts will only admit these "outcry" statements if the
prosecution can prove several elements. First, the statement must
be made by the child "to the first person, 18 years of age or older,
other than the defendant, to whom the child made a statement about
the offense."'25 This requirement builds off the analysis used by
several courts in holding that delayed reports by child sexual abuse
victims are admissible when the child makes the report at her first
real opportunity after remaining in the custody of the assailant.126
Second, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury,
the court must determine "that the statement is reliable based on
the time, content, and circumstances of the statement."' 27 This
standard gives courts much more leeway than the excited utterance
exception, which requires that courts only admit statements made
while the declarant is still under the stress of the startling event or
condition.1 21 Conversely, unlike evidence submitted under the
excited utterance exception, which can be mentioned for the first
time at trial, the party submitting an "outcry" statement must,
fourteen days before trial, provide the adverse party with: a) notice
of intent to introduce the statement; b) the name of the witness who
will provide the testimony; and c) a written summary of the
proposed statement. 12
9
Finally, also unlike the excited utterance exception, the child
must testify or be "available to testify at the proceeding in court or
in any other manner provided by law"'3 ° for an "outcry" statement
to be admissible. This final limitation ensures that the code
provision is rather unhelpful to many child sexual abuse victims.
Many child sexual abuse victims suffer so deeply from the abuse
that they are unable both physically and mentally to face their
attacker in court. 1' In many cases, the victim is not available to
124. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.072 (Vernon 1995); Hunt v. State, 904 S.W.2d
813, 815 n.1 (Tex. App. 1995).
125. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.072 § 2(a)(2) (Vernon 1995).
126. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
127. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.072 § 2(b)(2) (Vernon 1995).
128. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
129. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.072 § 2(b)(1)(A)-(C) (Vernon 1995).
130. Id. at § 2(b)(3).
131. See Michael J. Martin, Child Sexual Abuse: Preventing Continued Victimization by the
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testify, resulting in the exclusion of potential "outcry" witness
testimony. 1
32
In Rhode Island, the legislature enacted § 14-1-69 in 1985 to
relax the standards necessary for applying the excited utterance
exception to a child making an out-of-court statement about her
abuse. 133 Under this section:
[A] Family Court may, in its discretion, permit as evidence "any
statement by a child under the age of thirteen (13) years old
about a prescribed act of abuse, neglect or misconduct by a
parent or guardian, if such statement was made spontaneously
within a reasonable time after the act is alleged to have oc-
curred, and if the statement was made to someone the child
would normally turn to for sympathy, protection or advice. 134
Relying on the rationale previously cited from Padilla,135 the
legislature "replaced the requirement that the declarant be 'laboring
under the stress of nervous excitement' with the requirement that
the statement be 'made to someone the child would normally turn
to for sympathy, protection, or advice.""36
The Rhode Island courts have interpreted this statute fairly
liberally. Rhode Island courts have decided on at least two occasions
that the person to whom the child would normally turn to for
sympathy, protection, and advice need not be a person "previously
known to the speaker.' 131 In both In re Ne-kia S. and In re
Thomas,'13 courts found that allegations of abuse by children to
physicians were admissible under § 14-1-69 because physicians
occupy positions of trust. These rulings seem to be a fair extension
of the statute since children are likely to feel as secure with
physicians as they feel with family members. The extension also
appears fair to the extent that these courts have at least hinted in
Criminal Justice System and Associated Agencies, 41 FAM. REL. 330, 330 (1992) (stating that
"people fear the child will be so traumatized by the process and the outcome of the criminal
justice system that to prosecute would only further victimize the child.").
132. See, e.g., Glover v. State, 102 S.W.3d 754, 762 n.4 (Tex. App. 2002) ("A.H. was
unavailable to testify, so the State would have been forced to find an alternative basis for
admitting the hearsay statements.").
133. In re Jean Marie W., 559 A.2d 625, 631 (R.I. 1989) ('This change, in effect, created a
new, relaxed excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule specifically designed for the
young child-witness."); see also In re Deborah M., 544 A.2d 572, 574 (R.I. 1988).
134. Jean Marie W, 559 A.2d at 630 (quoting § 14-1-69).
135. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
136. In re Ne-kia S., 566 A.2d 392, 395 (R.I. 1989) (quoting In re Deborah M., 544 A.2d 572,
574 (R.I. 1988)).
137. Id. at 396.
138. 540 A.2d 1027 (R.I. 1988).
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dicta that physicians may be the only strangers to qualify under
§ 14-1-69.139
Washington similarly has a provision in its criminal code that
allows for the admission of child hearsay statements not qualifying
as excited utterances.'40 Under this provision, courts in Washington
consider whether "the time, content, and circumstances of the state-
ment provide sufficient indicia of reliability .... When the child
is unable to testify at the proceedings, her statements are only
admissible after the prosecution produces corroborative evidence of
the crime at issue."' Courts in Washington have determined that
evidence is corroborative when it 'support[s] a logical and reason-
able inference' that the act of abuse described in the hearsay
statement occurred.' 43
When the child is available to testify, however, her statements
may be admitted in their entirety to prove the crime at issue. 144
Conversely, the exception is more limited than other child hearsay
exceptions because it only applies when the child is ten years old or
younger, whereas the previously cited exceptions apply to state-
ments by children of up to twelve years of age. 45
In determining the admissibility of child hearsay statements
under this exception, Washington has created several factors to
weigh relevance. These are:
1. Whether the declarant, at the time of making the statement,
had an apparent motive to lie;
2. Whether the declarant's general character suggests trustwor-
thiness;
3. Whether more than one person heard the statement;
4. The spontaneity of the statement;
5. Whether trustworthiness is suggested from the timing of the
declaration and the relationship between the declarant and the
witness;
139. Ne-kia S., 566 A.2d at 396 (noting that children rarely turn to strangers for protection,
making physicians likely the only strangers to qualify under the statute).
140. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (West 2005).
141. State v. Swan. 790 P.2d 610, 613 n. 13 (Wash. 1990) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.120 (West 2005) (The determination is made by the court "in a hearing conducted
outside the presence of the jury ... ")).
142. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120(2)(b) (West 2005).
143. Swan, 790 P.2d at 615 (quoting State v. Hunt, 741 P.2d 566 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987)).
144. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (West 2005).
145. Id.; State v. Owens, 899 P.2d 833, 835 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) ("Because B.K. was over
the age of 10 when he made the challenged statements, the child hearsay statute, RCW
9A.44.120, does not apply ... ").
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6. Whether the statement contains express assertions of past
fact;
7. Whether the declarant's lack of knowledge could be estab-
lished by cross-examination;
8. The remoteness of the possibility that the declarant's recollec-
tion is faulty; and
9. Whether the surrounding circumstances suggest that the
declarant misrepresented the defendant's involvement. 4 '
As with the previous two exceptions, these factors give courts con-
siderably more latitude in determining whether to admit children's
hearsay statements than does the excited utterance exception.
b. Applying the Excited Utterance Exception More Leniently
for Adult Sexual Abuse Victims
i. Judicial Loosening of the Exception for Adult Sexual
Abuse Victims
Courts have been less willing to accept the theory that the
elements for admissibility of excited utterances should be less
demanding when made by rape and sexual assault victims. A few
courts have noted that courts should be more lenient in admitting the
excited utterances of adult sexual abuse survivors, particularly
concerning the time requirement.'47 Other courts have explicitly
stated that the elements for admissibility are not "at all relaxed in
circumstances involving a complaint of rape or sexual assault.' 48
Applying the test more liberally for rape and sexual assault victims,
however, appears to comport with a general principle of excited
utterance jurisprudence that, the more startling the occurrence,
the more likely courts are to admit excited utterances further
removed in time.'49 Most would agree that rape is among the most
traumatizing of crimes where the victim survives. Consequently, a
rape victim is under the stress of her rape for a longer period of time
than the plaintiff who slipped and fell on a wet store floor. This theory
146. State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197, 205 (Wash. 1984) (citing State v. Parris, 654 P.2d 77
(Wash. 1982)); see also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970).
147. See, e.g., State v. Creighton, 462 A.2d 980, 982 (R.I. 1983) ("Generally speaking, a less
demanding time requirement is necessary in sexual-offense cases .... ).
148. Commonwealth v. Davis, 767 N.E.2d 1110, 1116 n.2 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).
149. See, e.g., Lieberenz v. State, 717 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (admitting an
excited utterance made hours after a rape because "the greater the stress caused by the
startling event... the longer the effects of the stress may last").
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is borne out by the findings of many scholars on Rape Trauma
Syndrome ("RTS").
Although there is not a set definition of RTS,'° it generally holds
that victims often are confused and disoriented in the immediate
wake of a rape or sexual assault, resulting in delayed reporting when
the victim finally reconstructs the nature of the event. 151 Both
academics and courts have debated the efficacy of using RTS to
modify application of evidentiary rules. In the scholarly world, Aviva
Orenstein and Randolph N. Jonakait have debated about whether
evidence of RTS should be admissible in rape and sexual assault
cases to loosen the applicability of the excited utterance elements. 152
Orenstein initially argued that, based on research on RTS, courts
should not only apply the excited utterance elements more loosely,
but legislatures should also pass legislation explicitly changing the
excited utterance elements in rape and sexual assault cases. 153
Jonakait criticized Orenstein's arguments on several grounds.
His first argument was that Orenstein's "proposal would accomplish
almost nothing" because, under current laws, "[t]he defense
introduces such evidence with hopes that the delayed reports will
damage the credibility of the alleged rape victim."'54 This position
is either disingenuous or belies a fundamental misunderstanding by
Jonakait of the way evidence law works in rape and sexual assault
cases. Jonakait cites Andrew E. Taslitz for the proposition that "a
common defense strategy in rape cases is to establish the crime was
not promptly reported .... ,,15' Thus, the "evidence" that the defense
introduces in these cases is the fact that the alleged victim made a
delayed report, not the report itself or any of the graphic details the
150. Jonakait, supra note 22, at 275 ("There are disagreements as to what behavior
constitutes RTS .... The result is that the term RTS may not have much of a fixed
meaning.").
151. Orenstein, supra note 19, at 200:
Often the survivor initially suffers disorganization; she may be hysterical or she
may be withdrawn and subdued. The recovery from rape and other sexual
violence is a slow process. As the survivor begins to reorganize psychologically,
she experiences classic signs of post-traumatic stress, usually nightmares,
phobias, and sexual fears. Only over time do most survivors process memories,
begin to overcome the psychic numbing, and start talking to friends and
counselors.
152. Orenstein, supra note 19; Jonakait, supra note 22; Orenstein, Response, Evidence in
a Different Voice: Some Thoughts on Professor Jonakait's Critique of a Feminist Approach, 4
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 295 (1997).
153. Orenstein, supra note 19, at 210-22.
154. Jonakait, supra note 22, at 269.
155. Id. at 269 n.21 (construing Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape
Narratives in the Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 387, 447 (1996)).
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report might contain.'56 This distinction might seem insignificant to
Jonakait, but it is enough of a distinction that several legislatures
have created separate exceptions for victims' statements which do
not qualify as excited utterances where the fact of the report, but
not any of its details, is admissible. 5 7 Indeed, if Jonakait is correct
about the distinction being meaningless, why would there be so
many sexual assault cases where the admissibility of a delayed
excited utterance is at issue?
Second, Jonakait initially speculated that Orenstein's argument
could be that only delayed reports by sexual abuse victims are
reliable, which "should lead to more skepticism, and perhaps
exclusion, of the immediate report because of its unreliability.'
158
To the extent that courts' treatment of children's excited utterances
in sexual abuse cases is analogous, Jonakait's argument seems
fallacious. As argued in the previous section, courts often admit
delayed reports by children in sexual abuse cases as excited
utterances for an amalgam of reasons.'59 Yet, despite the fact that
courts find these delayed reports to be reliable, there is no indica-
tion that they treat prompt reports by child sexual assault victims
with any more skepticism. 6 °
Jonakait's argument only works if Orenstein's point that
delayed reports are reliable necessarily implies that prompt reports
cannot be reliable. Orenstein never makes this argument; she only
claims that sexual abuse victims may delay in reporting their abuse
rather than making a prompt report.'6 ' In fact, Orenstein never
even states that delayed reports are more frequent than prompt
reports in sexual abuse cases, a point over which Jonakait later
attacks her.'62
Perhaps recognizing the disingenuousness of his initial position,
Jonakait then proceeds to the other extreme. He begins innocently
enough, arguing that "[p]erhaps Orenstein does not really mean
that the psychology is backward, but instead intends to assert that
while prompt reports are trustworthy, delayed reports are even
more so. '63 He then asserts that the "only possible ground[]"
156. Taslitz, supra note 155, at 447.
157. See, e.g., infra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
158. Jonakait, supra note 22, at 273.
159. See supra notes 105-18 and accompanying text.
160. See id.
161. Orenstein, supra note 19, at 200 (discussing how rape victims "often" delay in
reporting the crime to others because of initial disorganization).
162. Jonakait, supra note 22, at 276 (arguing that Orenstein "never states that delayed
reports are more frequent than immediate ones").
163. Id. at 273.
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Orenstein posits for the superior trustworthiness of delayed
reporting in sexual abuse cases is their "typicality;" because RTS
posits that delayed reports are more frequent than prompt
reports, they are more reliable.'64 Yet as noted before and as noted
by Jonakait, Orenstein never makes this assertion.165 In fact, only
Jonakait argues that someone attempting to use RTS to alter
application of the excited utterance elements must prove that
delayed reports are more frequent.'66 And only Jonakait makes the
corollary argument that if this is the case, victims who make prompt
reports cannot have RTS.1
67
In truth, neither Orenstein nor RTS posits that delayed reports
are more typical than prompt reports, and this argument does not
need to be proven. Again, a good analogy can be found in courts'
analysis of delayed reports by child sexual abuse victims. Courts
have almost universally accepted the proposition that they should
apply the excited utterance elements more liberally in cases of child
sexual abuse because sometimes children are confused and do not
initially understand the abuse.'68 In none of these cases, however,
has the court found the need to justify this position by presenting
evidence that child sexual abuse victims delay in reporting the
abuse any more frequently than promptly reporting it.' 69 It is not
the typicality of delayed reporting in child sexual abuse cases that
justifies this position, but the understanding that children in these
cases are initially confused after the abuse, before later becoming
controlled by the stress of it. Thus, while a "regular" victim might
only be under the stress of the startling occurrence for minutes or
hours after a crime, a child sexual abuse victim might be under the
stress of the startling occurrence for days, weeks, or even months
after the startling event when she finally understands the abuse.
Since RTS posits that many adult rape and sexual assault
victims suffer through a similar stage of confusion and disorder
initially after the crime as do child victims, courts should similarly
be more lenient in admitting their excited utterances. Most courts,
while not explicitly accepting this analysis, have generally been
willing "to allow RTS evidence to explain delay, recantations, and
164. Id. at 274.
165. Id. at 276.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
169. None of the cases in supra notes 105-18 ever discusses extension of the excited
utterance exception in child sexual abuse cases being premised on the finding that children
predominantly delay in reporting this crime.
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seemingly normal or casual activities after the rape or other sexual
violence." 7 '
Further, although courts have not explicitly accepted this
analysis, they also have not been presented with the argument that
the delayed stress posited by RTS should be the basis for liberaliz-
ing the time element in excited utterance jurisprudence. Orenstein
argued that RTS rendered the excited utterance exception meaning-
less in rape and sexual assault cases and thus proposed a separate
exception that "eliminate[d] all timing requirements."'71 Courts,
however, may be more receptive to the argument that RTS should
result in the modification, rather than the revocation, of all timing
requirements under the excited utterance exception. Finally, courts
might be even more receptive to the argument .that RTS makes it
more likely that subsequent occurrences would be startling for rape
and sexual assault victims than such occurrences would be for most
other victims.
ii. Legislative Loosening of the Exception for Adult
Sexual Abuse Victims
Some states, such as Massachusetts, have allowed statements
to be introduced as fresh complaints when those statements would
not otherwise qualify as excited utterances. The fresh complaint
rule recognizes that it is normal for a sexual assault victim to
complain to others about sexual abuse and states that if the
complaint is "fresh," it is unlikely to be a fabrication by the alleged
victim.'72 Compared to the excited utterance exception, the standard
for admission of a fresh complaint is relaxed. 7 ' Excited utterances
must be made while the declarant is under the stress of a startling
occurrence; whereas, with a fresh complaint, the question is merely
whether the alleged victim acted reasonably in making the com-
plaint considering the, specific facts of the case. 74 Factors that a
court may consider in making the reasonableness determination
include: a) the age of the victim and particularly whether the victim
was a child; b) how long the victim was away from the abusive
setting before making the complaint; c) whether the assailant
170. Orenstein, supra note 19, at 202. In contrast, courts have been "particularly reluctant
to allow experts to testify that a survivor of rape or other sexual violence suffers from RTS in
order to prove that the woman did not consent." Id.
171. Id. at 215.
172. Commonwealth v. Foskette, 568 N.E.2d 1167, 1170-71 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
173. See Commonwealth v. Dockham, 542 N.E.2d 591, 596 (Mass. 1989); Commonwealth
v. Allen, 665 N.E.2d 105, 112 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996).
174. See Dockham, 542 N.E.2d at 596; Allen, 665 N.E.2d at 112.
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threatened the victim in the event that she spoke; and d) when the
victim is a child, whether the assailant was a relative or friend. 175
As with excited utterances, there is no specific time frame for
admissibility, 176 and courts apply the law more flexibly when the
victim is a child.
177
Fresh complaints can only be used in limited circumstances and
for limited purposes. First, juries "may consider fresh complaint
evidence only to the extent that it corroborates evidence given by
the alleged victim.... Evidence of a fresh complaint witness cannot
stand by herself and establish the factual assertions in evidence.' 78
Obviously, this is distinct from the excited utterance exception,
where statements of a victim or observer may be admitted even if
the declarant is unable or unwilling to testify at trial.179 Equally
important, fresh complaint evidence must be sanitized and unorig-
inal; it cannot contain any new information, and it must merely be
a short summary of the victim's statements. 8 ° If the fresh complaint
contains details "so graphic, colorful or gruesome as to have an
important effect on the jury," a court may exclude it.''
Thus, if a victim testifies in court in detail about how the
defendant brutally beat, cut, choked, and raped her, the observer to
whom the fresh complaint was made may then only generally testify
that the victim reported that the defendant raped her. The observer
can repeat benign details that the victim told her while making the
fresh complaint, but she cannot report any new or "graphic" details
that could influence the jury." 2 If the victim told the observer any
detail in her fresh complaint and forgot that detail when testifying,
the observer could not then testify to the omitted detail.'83 This
underscores the fact that the purpose of a fresh complaint witness
175. See Dockham, 542 N.E.2d at 596; Allen, 665 N.E.2d at 112.
176. See Dockham, 542 N.E.2d at 596; Allen, 665 N.E.2d at 112.
177. See Dockham, 542 N.E.2d at 596.
178. Commonwealth v. Scanlon, 592 N.E.2d 1279, 1285 (Mass. 1992).
179. FED. R. EVID. 803.
180. Commonwealth. v. Snow, 569 N.E.2d 838, 840 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Bailey, 348 N.E.2d 746 (Mass. 1976)) ("Fresh complaint witnesses may
testify [in sexual assault prosecution] to 'details' where the testimony contains 'no new
information' and is 'merely a short summary of the testimony the victim [himself or] herself
gave about the criminal events.).
181. Snow, 569 N.E.2d at 840 (citing Commonwealth v. Blow, 348 N.E.2d 794 (Mass.
1976)).
182. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Kirouac, 542 N.E.2d 270 (Mass. 1989) ("Witnesses may
not testify to details which add substantively to the complainant's account.")).
183. See Commonwealth v. Coleman, 567 N.E.2d 956, 960 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) ("[Fjresh
complaint evidence could only be used to corroborate and not to fill any gap in the
prosecution's case.").
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is to corroborate the gist of the victim's story rather than to provide
any substantive evidence about the crime itself.
In Maine, statements that are inadmissible as excited utter-
ances still may be admissible as first complaints or first reports.8 4
The first complaint exception combines elements of the exceptions
in Texas and Massachusetts. As with the "outcry" witness exception
in Texas, only the first statement made by the sexual abuse victim
is admissible under this exception.185 Like the fresh complaint
exception in Massachusetts, a first complaint cannot be used to
prove the facts of an allegation and can only be used to corroborate
a victim's testimony.186 In fact, the exception is even more restrictive
than the fresh complaint exception because the latter actually
allows a witness to testify about non-graphic details in the utterance
that reiterate in-court testimony.18 7 In contrast, the first complaint
exception is much narrower, only allowing the bare fact of the
complaint to be admitted without any details, including the name
of the assailant.'88 Thus, under the first complaint exception, a party
may introduce a witness to testify solely to the fact that the victim
told her about the rape, without any more detail, and only after the
victim testifies.
c. Conclusions
The efforts by both courts and legislatures to allow for the
admission of statements not qualifying as excited utterances for
both child and adult sexual assault victims are commendable, yet it
is clear that the separate exceptions created for these statements
still exclude several statements or their details. Furthermore, courts
have been reluctant to apply the excited utterance elements more
loosely, particularly in cases involving adult victims of rape and
sexual assault. Thus, although these legislative and judicial efforts
in some way diminish the damage from the disparate manners in
which courts have applied the excited utterance exception in sexual
184. State v. Ricker, 770 A.2d 1021, 1025 (Me. 2001); State v. Palmer, 624 A.2d 469, 471
(Me. 1993); State v. Lafrance, 589 A.2d 43, 45 (Me. 1991).
185. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
186. Lafrance, 589 A.2d at 45 ('"The fact that a complaint has been made is generally
admissible only to corroborate the victim's testimony, not to prove the crime."); State v. True,
438 A.2d 460, 464 (Me. 1981); State v. King, 122 A. 578, 579 (Me. 1923).
187. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
188. See Ricker, 770 A.2d at 1025 (quoting State v. Joel H., 755 A.2d 520, 526 (Me. 2000))
('This exception is 'very narrow and allows only the bare fact of the complaint to be admitted
...."); Palmer, 624 A.2d at 471; State v. Calor, 585 A.2d 1385, 1387 (Me. 1991); Lafrance, 589
A.2d at 45.
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abuse cases, the divisions among courts are still relevant in many
cases.
4. How Being Questioned About an Event Plays a Part
It is universally accepted that the fact that a statement is made
in response to a question does not necessarily prevent it from being
an excited utterance."8 9 Thus, any court would admit a victim's
emotional reporting of a rape a minute after the crime, even if the
report followed questioning from a concerned observer. Courts do,
however, vary considerably in the weight to which they accord such
questioning. Some courts merely consider whether the occurrence
in question was startling and, when questioning accompanied the
occurrence, go on to state the general rule finding that the question-
ing will not alter their decision. 9 ' Other courts have held that the
fact that a statement is made in response to a question makes its
spontaneity more questionable, resulting in a closer analysis of
whether the statement was made while under the stress of the
startling occurrence.' 9
Conversely, building off of the general theory that courts should
be liberal in admitting the excited utterances of children, some
courts have found that this theory also applies to children. In People
in the Interest of O.E.P., the court construed several cases as holding
that "[a]n inquiry, especially one addressed to a child of tender
years, is not sufficient in itself to undo the underlying basis in
reliability for the excited utterance exception."'92
Further, some courts have found that under certain conditions,
questioning can be a startling occurrence or at least a factor
189. See, e.g., Gross v. Grier, 773 F.2d 116, 120 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v.
Glenn, 473 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("Such statements may be admissible although made in
response to an inquiry.")).
190. Id.; In re Ne-kia S., 566 A.2d 392, 395 (R.I. 1989); State v. Creighton, 462 A.2d 980,
982 (R.I. 1983) ("The fact that the statement was made in response to an inquiry does not
render the excited utterance doctrine inapplicable."); State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d 817, 821-22
(Tenn. 1997) ("[Sltatements made in response to questions may still be admissible if the
declarant is under the excitement or stress of the event.").
191. Guthrie v. United States, 207 F.2d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (quoting Beausoleil v.
United States, 107 F.2d 292, 294-95 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ('That the statements in the present case
were made in response to inquiry is not decisive of the question of spontaneity, as appellant
contends, although that fact is entitled to consideration.")); Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155,
160 n.2 (Tex. App. 1999) (holding that a statement being in response to a question is a
"factor[] for the trial court to consider in weighing whether the victim's statements were
sufficiently reliable and spontaneous"); State v. Chapin, 826 P.2d 194, 199 (Wash. 1992) ("The
fact that a statement is made in response to a question will not by itself require [that] the
statement be excluded, but it is a factor that raises doubts as to whether the statement was
truly a spontaneous and trustworthy response to a startling external event.").
192. 654 P.2d 312, 318 (Colo. 1982).
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contributing to the stress a declarant is under from a subsequent
startling occurrence. In State v. Owens, for example, a child ("B.K.")
was allegedly molested repeatedly by the defendant ("Owens").19
The child's health had continually worsened after his family moved
in with Owens, prompting his mother to take him to the doctor. 
194
After an intrusive medical examination, the doctor concluded that
B.K. might have been sexually abused, leading his mother to ask
him "pointed questions.., as to whether he had been molested...
",195 In response to the questioning, B.K. screamed, cried, and
admitted that he had been molested by Owens.196 The court found
that the medical examination, combined with the questioning,
"recreated the original stress caused by the acts of abuse and
constituted a startling event ..."1"
In Glover v. State, however, a court in Texas misinterpreted the
excited utterance exception in excluding purported excited utter-
ances made by a fourteen-year-old victim of sexual assault.19 There,
the victim's parents were separated, and the victim was at her
father's house when she snuck out and was picked up by the twenty-
six-year-old defendant, who took her to his place.199 Her mother then
found out about her daughter's actions and called the defendant to
confirm that he had picked her up, but she had no knowledge of any
sexual activity between the two.200 When the victim arrived at her
mother's house, the mother said she had talked to the defendant
and 'knew everything,' but wanted to hear it from her daughter."
201
According to the mother, the victim then became "uptight, emo-
tional, [and] increasingly shaky... coupled with agitated behavior
including crying and wringing of hands" while telling her mother of
the sexual activity.0 2
Despite the declarant's obviously emotional state, the court
excluded her statements as excited utterances, distinguishing the
case from another Texas case, Hunt v. State. °3 In Hunt, an eleven-
year-old girl became emotional after seeing a news program about
a young rape victim. 2 4 When her mother asked her why she was
193. 899 P.2d 833, 836 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
194. Id. at 835.
195. Id. at 836.
196. Id. at 835.
197. Id. at 836.
198. 102 S.W.3d 754 (Tex. App. 2002).
199. Id. at 761.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 764 (citing Hunt v. State, 904 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. App. 1995)).
204. Id. (citing Hunt, 904 S.W.2d).
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crying, she said that she was scared that she might be pregnant
from a rape three months earlier. °5 The court found that the child's
stress in Hunt was the result of an "independent and otherwise
nonstressful experience."20 6 Since the mother's "question was
generalized and did not anticipate any particular response," the
daughter's statement was admissible as an excited utterance.0 7
The court in Glover found that the questioning in the case
before it was "calculated to elicit information," and direct and
specific, in contrast to the generalized questioning in Hunt.2 8 The
court then rejected the girl's statements as excited utterances
because "[r]esponses to this type of questioning are not sponta-
neous."2 9 This analysis seems contrary to a guiding principle of
excited utterance jurisprudence that "what makes an event startling
is its effect upon the person perceiving it. '210 Under this principle,
questioning could be extremely generalized in nature, and the
situation would still not be stressful unless the declarant found it to
be stressful. Conversely, a mother could intend for her questioning
to elicit the exact response given by her daughter, and the situation
would still be stressful if the declarant found it to be stressful. By
relying on the nature of the questioning, and not its effect on the
declarant, the Texas court inappropriately applied the excited
utterance exception. As will be found in the subsequent section,
courts in Texas have had similar difficulties applying the excited
utterance exception in cases with subsequent startling occurrences
based on a failure to look at the effect of these occurrences on the
declarant.
II. THE HEART OF THE SPLIT - CAN AN EXCITED UTTERANCE BE
PROMPTED BY A SUBSEQUENT STARTLING OCCURRENCE?
The argument that statements made after one has
calmed down can never be excited utterances
presents an unsettled legal question.2 '
Many courts have concluded that "[t]he startling occurrence
that triggers an excited utterance need not necessarily be the crime
205. Id. (citing Hunt, 904 S.W.2d at 815).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 765 n.5 (construing Hunt, 904 S.W.2d at 815).
208. Id. at 765.
209. Id.
210. State v. Owens, 899 P.2d 833, 836 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
211. United States v. Donaldson, 58 M.J. 477, 483 (CAAF 2003).
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itself."'212 Rather, a second startling occurrence, removed in time
from the crime at issue, can "trigger[] associations with an original
trauma, thereby recreating the original stress and causing the
declarant to exclaim spontaneously.""21 Other courts have either
explicitly held that the startling occurrence precipitating an excited
utterance must be the "offense being prosecuted" or have failed to
consider whether subsequent startling occurrences can so qualify." 4
212. Aguilera v. State, 75 S.W.3d 60, 68 (Tex. App. 2002) (citing Couchman v. State, 3
S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex. App. 1999)).
213. Owens, 899 P.2d at 835; see also Murphy Auto Parts Co. v. Ball, 249 F.2d 508, 511-12
(D.C. Cir. 1957):
Most often the excited utterance, as a practical matter, relates to the exciting
cause, i.e., description of an accident, an attack, etc., but if the utterance goes
beyond a description of the occurrence and still meets the other tests of the
excited utterance rule, we think it should be received if it is relevant.
See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 271 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[Ihe caselaw indicates
that even statements that refer to prior events or thoughts may be admissible as excited
utterances."); In re Troy P., 842 P.2d 742, 747 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) ("Courts have, therefore,
admitted spontaneous utterances made well after the event when the declarant was suddenly
subjected to rekindled excitement."); State v. Carpenter, 773 S.W.2d 1, 9 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1989) ("Despite the length of time within which the victim reflected on the missing money,
this court believes that her final comments resulted from the suspect's return to the scene
rather than the theft itself."); Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex. App. 1999) ("We
also note that the startling occurrence that triggers an excited utterance need not necessarily
be the crime itself."); Bondurant v. State, 956 S.W.2d 762, 765 (Tex. App. 1997) ("The startling
event which triggers an excited utterance need not necessarily be the crime itself."); Britton
v. Washington Water Power Co., 110 P. 20, 21 (Wash. 1910):
The time of the occurrence of the principal act is sometimes by reason of
some special circumstance, extended forward so as to make it coincident and
connected with subsequent declarations by constructive continuity of time, as,
for instance, when the party making the declarations having become unconscious
at the very moment of the occurrence of the principal act, the declarations are
made by him at the very moment of his regaining consciousness ....
214. United States v. Knox, 46 M.J. 688,695 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 1997) ('"To be admissible,
an excited utterance must be made while under the excitement of the offense being
prosecuted."); see, e.g., Keefe v. State, 72 P.2d 425, 428 (Ariz. 1937):
[Tihe evidence in no way indicates that the statements of the children were the result
of nervous excitement and shock caused by the crime with which the defendant is
charged, but rather that they were an attempt at an excuse for an entirely
independent incident, occurring a number of days after the alleged crime could have
been committed.
See also, State v. Messamore, 639 P.2d 413, 419 (Hawaii App. 1982) (rejecting a girl's excited
statements about prior sexual abuse when they were made while being spanked for urinating
on the stairs, after stating her fear of urinating because these statements were "made not in
response to the actual event in question"); State v. Lafrance, 589 A.2d 43, 46 (Me. 1991)
(rejecting a girl's excited statements about prior sexual abuse because "[she] was behaving
normally until she learned that her mother would not let her stay overnight," leading her to
suffer "the stress of fear over returning to her own apartment while [the defendant] was still
living there"); Deloso v. State, 376 A.2d 873, 877 (Md. App. 1977) (holding that there must
be a continuance of the stress caused by the offense being prosecuted for a statement to
qualify as an excited utterance although, "as is obvious from [Moore v. State, 338 A.2d 344
(Ct. App. Md. 1975)], time is not a conclusive factor); Harnish v. State, 266 A.2d 364, 366 (Md.
App. 1970):
A SHOCK TO THE SYSTEM
Finally, other courts have given lip service to the theory that
subsequent startling occurrences can give rise to excited utterances
while the actual reasoning in their cases has made clear that only
the crime itself can give rise to an excited utterance.
Two cases from Texas clearly illustrate this point. In Mosley v.
State,215 a three-year-old girl ("S.M.") lived with her step-grandmother
and frequently visited her father. She was allegedly sexually
assaulted by her father on several of these visits.216 In the week before
a visit with her father, the daughter "became agitated and 'panicky'
at the prospect of returning to visit [her father]," crying and claiming
that he had hurt her.217 The court found that these statements did
not constitute excited utterances because "[t]he 'excitement' expe-
rienced by the declarant must be continuous between the event
itself and the statement describing it."2 ' Because "a number of days
passed between the time S.M. was molested and the time at which
she made her statement," S.M. did not have the "uninterrupted
emotional state" necessary to have her statements qualify as excited
utterances.2" 9 Thus, even if S.M. were controlled by the stress
"springing from the event which she described" - the prospect of
returning to her father - her statements were inadmissible because
she did not suffer from stress continuously from the last act of abuse
until the time of her emotional statements.22 °
By itself, there is nothing inconsistent about the court's opinion.
The court apparently sided with the precedent requiring the
startling occurrence to be the crime itself, refusing to even consider
that the imminent return of a young sexual assault victim to her
father could form the predicate for an excited utterance. In Aguilera
v. State,22 however, the court relied upon Mosley to exclude the
hearsay statements of a minor ("Smith") who made statements
While the statement given to the mother may have been spontaneous in the
sense that it constituted a generated or sparked reason for his unwillingness to
visit the appellant on that occasion, it is evident that the statement cannot be
characterized as being an integral part of the transaction or event which is
alleged to have occurred on January 3, 1969.
See also Commonwealth v. Santiago, 755 N.E.2d 795, 803 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001), rev'd by
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 774 N.E.2d 143 (Mass. 2002) (holding that a mother's viewing
of the arrest of her boyfriend could not be a startling event because she had "ample time,
opportunity and motive to think about her boyfriend's situation and to contrive a story in an
effort ... to exonerate him").
215. 960 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. App. 1997).
216. Id. at 202.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 204.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. 75 S.W.3d 60 (Tex. App. 2002).
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about sexual abuse by her stepfather upon learning that she would
be forced to move back with him.222 In finding that the statements
did not qualify as excited utterances, the court surprisingly noted
that "[t]he startling occurrence that triggers an excited utterance
need not necessarily be the crime itself."'223 Despite this language,
the court then cited Mosley for the proposition that "the 'excitement'
experienced by the declarant must be continuous between the event
itself and the statement describing it. ' 224 The court held that
because a significant period of time had passed between the last
alleged act of abuse and the statements, "Smith was not still under
the stress or excitement caused by the event., 225
The question remains as to how, if stress must be continuous
between the alleged crime and the statements, a subsequent startling
occurrence that is not the crime can ever be the impetus for an excited
utterance. If stress must be continuous between the crime and the
statements, the second startling occurrence becomes irrelevant
because the declarant is still controlled by the stress created by the
crime itself. As noted above, the theory behind admitting excited
utterances prompted by a subsequent startling occurrence is that such
an occurrence rekindles the original stress of the crime.226 This
necessarily requires that the original stress from the crime has dis-
sipated and that the continuous stressful state Mosley and Aguilera
required be interrupted.
What makes these cases more troublesome is the fact that other
cases in Texas, including a case upon which the Aguilera decision
relied, have clearly held that statements made while under the
stress of subsequent startling events or conditions may be admissi-
ble as excited utterances, even when the declarant was not in a
continuously stressful state between the crime and the statements.
In Couchman v. State,227 the case cited by Aguilera for the proposi-
tion that the startling occurrence need not be the crime itself, a
four-year-old child ("A.T.") was allegedly sexually abused by her
mother's boyfriend ("Tony"). After the alleged abuse, her father and
his sister picked her up and she played all day with no signs of
discomfort.228 Later that evening, after the sister washed A.T.'s hair,
she told A.T. to wash her body. 29 At this point, "A.T. became upset
222. Id. at 68.
223. Id. (citing Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex. App. 1999)).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
227. 3 S.W.3d 155 (Tex. App. 1999).
228. Id. at 157.
229. Id.
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and refused to wash her genital area, saying it hurt and burned.
When [the sister] asked why A.T. was hurting, A.T. pointed to her
genitals and said Tony had touched her and stuck his finger inside
her."23 The defendant attempted to have these statements excluded
as hearsay, claiming that they were "too far removed from the
original [offense] to be an excited utterance." '' The court found that
there was no need to consider the underlying offense because "the
startling condition that evoked A.T.'s statements could have been the
pain she was experiencing." '232 Thus, because the court found that
A.T. was still controlled by the stress resulting from the pain in her
genital area, it admitted her statements as excited utterances.
233
Similarly, in the previously cited Hunt v. State,234 an eleven-
year-old girl ("K.S.") was allegedly sexually assaulted by a friend's
father. Three months later, she began crying profusely after she saw
a television program about a young rape victim. 235 Upon questioning
from her mother, she cried out that she had been raped by her
friend's father and that watching the program made her fearful that
she may be pregnant.2 36 The defendant attempted to have the
statement excluded as hearsay, contending that "the startling
occurrence.., was the alleged assault and could not have been any
ideas or notions which arose from K.S.'s viewing of a television news
story three months later., 237 The court disagreed, holding that "the
startling event which triggers an excited utterance need not
necessarily be the crime itself.,238 As with Couchman, there was no
argument that the victim was in a continuously stressful state from
the moment of the assault until the moment of her statement.
Instead, the court accepted the argument that watching the
program revived the previously dormant stress the girl suffered as
a result of the alleged crime.239
Regardless of whether the broader or more limited interpreta-
tion of what constitutes an excited utterance is proper, the courts in
Texas must resolve this conflict. State supreme courts should
always strive to resolve obvious splits among state trial courts, but
this directive becomes much clearer when trial courts rely on the
language of other trial courts to arrive at seemingly contradictory
230. Id. at 157-58.
231. Id. at 159.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 160.
234. 904 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. App. 2001).
235. Id. at 815.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 815.
238. Id. at 816.
239. Id.
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conclusions. Further, if courts, such as those in Aguilera, truly
believe that stress must be continuous between the crime and the
statement, they should dispense with language stating that a
startling occurrence need not be the crime itself. Otherwise, both
lawyers and their clients will have no clear understanding of which
statements may be admissible over hearsay objections. Having
dispensed with the conflict in Texas, the central question still
remains as to whether statements should be admissible as excited
utterances if they are made under the stress of startling occurrences
transpiring after the initial crime.
A. Recurring Situations Involving the Admissibility of Statements
Made in Response to Subsequent Startling Events
The issue of whether subsequent startling occurrences can form
the predicates for excited utterances arises in a variety of factual
situations. The disputes between courts are best understood
through examining three frequently recurring scenarios. These
scenarios are a child sexual abuse victim: 1) being returned to the
site of her abuse, 2) being caught mimicking sexual positions
'learned" from abuse, and 3) experiencing vaginal pain from prior
abuse.
1. Res Gestae Versus Excited Utterances
The most persistent problem plaguing courts in applying the
excited utterance exception is continuing reliance on the elements
of the res gestae exception that have no application to the excited
utterance exception. As previously noted, res gestae was admitted
only when stress was continuous between the startling occurrence
and the declarant's statement. The excited utterance exception has
no such requirement, as it is based on spontaneity, not contem-
poraneity.24 ° Second, while res gestae had to explain, elucidate, or
in some way characterize the startling occurrence, the excited
utterance exception allows for a much looser connection (or no
connection at all) between utterance and occurrence.241 When courts
have considered the admissibility of statements made by sexually
abused children who are faced with the prospect of being returned
to the site of their abuse, the situation referenced in the introduc-
tion,242 and when caught mimicking sexual positions "learned" from
240. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text.
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prior abuse, some courts have improperly relied on the vestiges of
res gestae to exclude statements that should be potentially admissi-
ble as excited utterances.
a. Children Making Excited Utterances upon Being Told
That They Are Being Returned to the Site of Their Abuse
As noted in the introduction to this article, courts in different
states have disagreed over whether statements made by alleged
sexual abuse victims in anticipation of their imminent return to the
site of their abuse may be admitted as excited utterances.243 In State
v. Lafrance, the thirteen-year-old victim and the defendant, her
mother's ex-husband, lived in the same apartment.244 One night, the
defendant allegedly sexually assaulted the victim, "touch[ing] her
breasts and genital area through her clothes." '245 The victim had
planned on spending the next night at a friend's house and, when
her mother told her that she had to return to the apartment, the
victim "became visibly upset... [and] blurted out the details of what
had transpired the night before....""'
The court refused to admit this statement as an excited
utterance despite acknowledging that the victim "was experiencing
the stress of fear over returning to her own apartment while [the
defendant] was still living there." '247 The court first held that the
victim's stress in reaction to this subsequent startling event was not
sufficient; the victim was not still under the stress of the original
sexual assault, therefore, her statement did not qualify as an
excited utterance.24 The court further held that her statement was
not made while still under the stress of the assault because the
victim had already told her friend the details of the assault before
recounting them to her mother.249
The court in Mosley v. State came to a similar conclusion in a
case where a three-year-old girl was allegedly sexually assaulted by
her father. ° The girl's mother was in jail, and her step-grandmother
had custody of her, although her father "frequently took her on
visitation ... "251 While at her step-grandmother's house after a two
243. See supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text.
244. 589 A.2d 43, 44 (Me. 1991).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 44-45.
247. Id. at 46.
248. Id. (holding that there was no evidence that the victim "was still under the stress of
excitement caused by [the defendant's] alleged unlawful sexual contact").
249. Id.
250. 960 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Tex. App. 1997).
251. Id.
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week visit with her father, the victim "became agitated and 'panicky'
at the prospect of returning to visit [her father]." '252 While crying,
she told her step-grandmother that her father hurt her, and she
"demonstrated various forms of sexual assault she alleged [her
father] had performed on her."2 3
As in Lafrance, the court rejected the victim's statements as
excited utterances, despite granting that the victim's "agitation
may, indeed, be genuine, and springing from the event she described
... .,,254 Again, the deficiency with the statement was that it was not
made while under the initial stress caused by the sexual assault.255
According to the court, "[t]he 'excitement' experienced by the
declarant must be continuous between the event itself and the
statement describing it." '256 Because several days had passed between
the alleged assault and the statements, the court excluded the
statements, even though they were made after a later, related event
causing the agitation.257
Other courts, however, have found that this type of subsequent
startling event can form the predicate for an excited utterance. In
In re Troy P., the parents of a four-year-old girl separated, with the
father having custody during weekdays and the mother having
custody on weekends.258 After staying with her mother for a
weekend, the girl cried when her mother told her she would be
returning to her father's home, saying that she did not want to go. 259
When her mother questioned her, she claimed that someone had
"touched" her.2' 0 The mother did not pursue this allegation, but after
the daughter stayed with her again during another weekend, the
daughter "began screaming and crying" at the prospect of returning
to her father's home.261' The girl then told her mother that it was her
babysitter's son who had "touched" her.2
62
The court determined that "the imminent return of the victim to
her father could support admission of her statements as an excited
utterance. 263 Unlike the preceding cases, the court in Troy P. held
that the victim's statement was admissible even though she was not
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 204.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. 842 P.2d 742, 743 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
259. Id. at 744.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 747.
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in a continuously stressful state between the time of the sexual
assault and the time when she made her statements.264 The court
came to this conclusion based primarily on three factors. First, the
court cited several cases26 for the proposition that statements made
well after an initially startling occurrence are admissible "when the
declarant [i]s suddenly subjected to rekindled excitement." '266
Second, the court cited Louisell & Mueller for the more specific
argument that such rekindling is more likely when the underlying
startling occurrence is especially stressful, causing deep trauma which
makes the declarant more susceptible to renewed stress from related
events. 267 Finally, the court premised admission on the generally
accepted theory that children tend to react to stress differently than
adults, allowing admission of excited utterances made longer after a
startling occurrence when the declarant is a child.2"
The court in Esser v. Commonwealth similarly admitted state-
ments by a sexual abuse victim made in response to being told that
she was being returned to the custody of her alleged assailant.269
There, a nineteen-year-old girl with physical and mental disabilities
was visiting her aunt when the aunt's live-in boyfriend allegedly
"raped and sexually assaulted her."27 Two days later, when the
mother was going to work, the victim became upset, crying hysteri-
cally about the possibility of being returned to her aunt's home.27'
The girl told her mother she might be pregnant, prompting the
mother to question her daughter's prior claims of virginity.2 The
girl then told her mother about the incident, describing it in detail.273
Again, the court found that the prospect of being returned to the
site of abuse qualified as a startling event which could form the
predicate for an excited utterance. 274 As with Troy P., the court cited
several cases to support its holding that statements made about a
crime may be admissible when prompted by a subsequent startling
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 933, 1016-17 (2d Cir. 1990); United States
v. Napier, 518 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1975).
266. In re Troy P., 842 P.2d 742, 747 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
267. Id. at 746-47 (quoting 4 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER MUELLER, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 439 (1980)) ("Events may so deeply traumatize a person that long after stress has
subsided a chance reminder may have enormous psychological impact, causing renewed stress
and excitement and educing utterances relating to the original trauma.").
268. Id. at 747.
269. 566 S.E.2d 876, 878-79 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).
270. Id. at 878.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 878-79.
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occurrence that triggers associations with the underlying crime.275
The court also considered the physical and mental attributes of the
girl to conclude that being returned to the site of the abuse would be
particularly stressful for her. 6
When the reasons for these disparate conclusions are consid-
ered, it becomes apparent that cases such as Lafrance and Mosley
are being decided incorrectly, primarily because the judges deciding
them are considering factors relevant to res gestae, but irrelevant to
excited utterances. These cases first exclude the victim's statements
as excited utterances by relying on the argument that stress must
be continuous between the time of the sexual abuse and the time
when the victim makes the statements. 7 As Bayne v. State noted,
however, the argument that stress must be continuous from the
crime to the statement is a vestige of the res gestae exception, under
which statements had to be a "continuing part of the transaction"
begun by the underlying event. 8 Unfortunately, as courts have
made the transition between the res gestae exception and the excited
utterance exception, some judges have continued to apply this
"continuing part of the transaction" requirement to statements
being considered under the excited utterance exception.279
This application is fallacious because [t]he primary focus in
construing the excited utterance exception is not on the continua-
tion of transaction theory applicable to res gestae concepts
generally. Rather, the focus in construing the excited utterance
exception is on the happening of an excitable occurrence sufficient
to generate an utterance without reflective opportunity - the
very concept of an excited utterance."'
Thus, with res gestae, for a statement about occurrence A to be
admissible, it must be made as a continuing part of that transaction,
excluding statements made about occurrence A after the original
stress from occurrence A has subsided, even if startling occurrence
B subsequently rekindles that stress. Under the excited utterance
exception, however, a statement made under this latter scenario
should be admissible if: a) it is made while the declarant is still
under the stress of occurrence B, and, under some formulations of
the exception, b) it bears some relationship to occurrence B.
275. Id. at 879-80.
276. Id. at 880 ("Her physical condition made her unable to protect herself from any future
assaults.").
277. See supra notes 258, 267 and accompanying text.
278. 632 A.2d 476, 484 (Md. App. 1993).
279. Id.
280. Id.
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Of course, as the courts in both Lafrance and Mosley noted, the
statements made by the declarants were made while the declarant
was still under the stress of occurrence B, the prospect of being
returned to the site of their abuse, so a) is satisfied. While this
article does not attempt to resolve the dispute noted in section I.C.2.
over the extent to which an excited utterance must relate to the
startling occurrence prompting it, it seems safe to say that state-
ments about sexual abuse committed by a person living at a
residence relate to the event of a child being told that she is being
returned to that residence, satisfying b). Thus, it seems apparent
that courts in cases such as Lafrance and Mosley are improperly
excluding statements under the excited utterance exception based
on res gestae elements. In fact, the only difference between state-
ments made while under the stress of an initial startling occurrence
and those made while under the stress of a subsequent startling
occurrence is that, in the latter situation, the initial occurrence may
not be as fresh in the declarant's mind. As noted, however, this
difference has no practical relevance under the excited utterance
exception.2"'
Second, in excluding these statements under the excited
utterance exception, these cases fail to note the general principle
that the excited utterance elements are applied more liberally when
the declarant is a child.282 Of course, the simple fact that the great
majority of courts apply this principle does not make the principle
correct. Indeed, it is important to note that, unlike in other cases, in
neither Lafrance nor Mosley did the court acknowledge this
principle and reject it. Instead, both courts simply neglected to
mention it.
Further, as noted in section I.C.3.a., there should be no reason
for judges to apply the excited utterance exception in the same
manner for children as for adults. The basis for the exception is that
statements made while under the stress of a startling occurrence
are reliable because they remove the ability of the declarant to
fabricate an occurrence, forcing him to tell the truth instinctively.
Courts, however, cannot apply this exception in a vacuum. Thus, a
central principle in excited utterance jurisprudence is that determi-
nation of whether an occurrence is startling is subjective, based on
its effect on the declarant, not objective, based on the properties of
the occurrence itself.28 3 The weight of the research has shown that
children respond to stress differently than adults, making their
281. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 105-18 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
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statements more trustworthy when separated in time from a
startling occurrence than similar statements by adults.284 Unless
courts such as those deciding Lafrance and Mosley can explain why
this research is fallacious, it seems that courts should be bound to
accept (or at least address) the argument that the excited utterance
elements should be loosened when the declarant is a child.
Third, in excluding these statements, the court in Lafrance im-
properly relied on the fact that the victim had already told her friend
the details of the assault before recounting them to her mother.2"5
This error is evinced by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts'
decision in Commonwealth v. Santiago.28 6 Previously, the Court of
Appeals had found that the arrest of a boyfriend for sexually
assaulting his girlfriend's daughter was not a startling event which
could form the predicate for an excited utterance.287 Before this
arrest, the mother, with her boyfriend in the room, had received a
phone call from the school guidance counselor reporting that her
daughter had accused the boyfriend of sexual abuse. 28 The court
thus found that her subsequent viewing of the boyfriend's arrest was
not a startling event because "the declarant had ample time,
opportunity and motive to think about [the] situation and contrive a
story in an effort, however naive and ill-conceived, to exonerate
him."2 9 Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court
erred in admitting her statement that the boyfriend "put his finger
into her vagina, but did not have intercourse with [her] .,,290
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts reversed, holding that the
Court of Appeals had conducted the analysis incorrectly.9 ' Instead of
focusing on the declarant's opportunity to fabricate between an initial
startling event and a subsequent startling event, the Court of Appeals
should have considered whether "the occurrence of the subsequent
event (here, the arrest) [was] likely to produce a nonreflective
exclamation about the prior event (here, the defendant's statement to
her) .,,2' Again, the logic behind excited utterances is that they disable
the reflective capacity; thus, if an event is determined to be suffi-
ciently startling, it "negate[s] premeditation or possible fabrication,"
rendering irrelevant any plans the declarant made in the interim.293
284. See supra Section I.C.3.a.
285. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
286. 774 N.E.2d 143 (Mass. 2002).
287. Commonwealth v. Santiago, 755 N.E.2d 795, 803 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001).
288.. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 799.
291. Santiago, 774 N.E.2d at 148.
292.. Id.
293. Id.
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A court properly determines that an event is not startling when
it bases this decision on the event's effect on the declarant. Thus, if
the court found that the mother was not actually startled by the
arrest, it could have excluded her statement because it failed to
meet the "startling event or condition" requirement of the excited
utterance exception. When courts exclude statements on the basis
of (hypothetical) prior behavior, they are no longer applying the
excited utterance elements properly.294 As the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts noted, there was an adequate "degree of excitement
displayed by the mother" to convince it that the arrest was startling,
rendering meaningless any behavior she engaged in before that
event.295 Whether the mother had previously concocted a story to
exonerate her boyfriend was irrelevant. If the court found the
subsequent arrest to be sufficiently startling based on its effect on
the mother, it should have admitted the statement as an excited
utterance under the theory that her statement would be instinc-
tively truthful. Similarly, the Lafrance court improperly relied on
prior statements by the declarant rather than the fact that she
appeared "visibly upset" at being forced to remain at home in
excluding her statements as excited utterances.96
b. Children Making Excited Utterances upon Being Caught
Mimicking Sexual Positions "Learned" from Prior Abuse
When courts have been presented with statements made by
child sexual abuse victims, after being caught mimicking sexual
positions 'learned" from prior abuse, some courts have similarly
excluded such statements as excited utterances based on misunder-
standings of excited utterance jurisprudence. In Keefe v. State,297 a
mother walked in on her four-year-old daughter and six-year-old son
"engaged in immoral conduct ....2 When the mother began to
chastise her children, the daughter responded that the "defendant
did such things to her all the time," and gave "a fairly comprehen-
sive and detailed account" of previous acts of sexual abuse.29 9 The
court rejected the daughter's statements as excited utterances,
holding that the daughter was laboring under the stress of being
found engaged in the sexual act and not the stress of the alleged act
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. See supra notes 248, 267 and accompanying text.
297. 72 P.2d 425 (Ariz. 1937).
298. Id. at 426.
299. Id. Upon questioning, the brother "confirmed his sister's statements, saying that he
had witnessed such acts." Id.
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of sexual abuse earlier in the week."' In doing so, the court rejected
the rationale that a subsequent startling event can revive the
original stress of the crime and make a later declaration reliable." 1
In WC.L. v. People,0 2 the court rejected statements made by a
four-year-old after she was allegedly raped by her sixteen-year-old
uncle. After staying with an aunt for two days, the victim went to
stay with another aunt.0 3 At night, when the aunt was preparing
the victim and her son for baths, "and while all the children were
undressed, the victim faced the aunt's six-year-old son, spread her
legs, and said, 'Get me.' 30 4 The aunt "spoke the victim's name and
asked what she was doing in a tone that apparently startled the
child."3 5 Five to ten minutes later, the aunt asked the victim where
she learned what she had done, "and the child replied, 'Uncle
[W.C.L.] tickles me."'30 6 When the aunt asked her where he tickled
her, "the victim pointed to her genitals.""3 7 While the trial court had
admitted the statements as excited utterances because "the
startling event was the aunt's response to the child's suggestive
gesture," the court relied on Keefe to exclude the statements. 08
In Bayne v. State,"9 a Maryland court was presented with a
very similar set of facts. An uncle discovered "the five-year-old
victim on top of her young cousin in the boy's bed 'riding him in a
sexual motion."'310 When questioned by her uncle, the victim
panicked, left with her grandmother, and eventually told her
grandmother about the prior abuse "within twenty minutes of the
uncle's discovery. ' The court noted that Keefe was still good law
300. Id. at 428:
The matter which elicited the statements was obviously not any act which had
occurred the previous Monday, but the shock caused the children by being found
in flagrante delicto, and the children's statement was obviously an attempt to
justify their behavior at the time by giving defendant's previous conduct as an
excuse therefor [sic], rather than the nervous excitement caused by any acts of
the latter.
301. Id. at 427 (holding that a statement cannot be an excited utterance if the "nervous
excitement has died away so that the remark is elicited by the shock of some other act not at
issue, which revives the memory of the act in question").
302. 685 P.2d 176 (Colo. 1984).
303. Id. at 177.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 180. The court also found that the child's statements were not spontaneous, but
this analysis had no impact on the court's decision that the victim's acts combined with the
aunt's response did not constitute a startling event. Id. (reaching the spontaneity issue only
after finding there was not a startling occurrence).
309. 632 A.2d 476 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993).
310. Id. at 483.
311. Id.
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and recognized the precedent holding that subsequent startling
occurrences cannot form the predicates for excited utterances.312 The
court, however, rejected this line of precedent, arguing that those
decisions were decided improperly based on elements applicable to
res gestae but not to excited utterances. 31
3
First, the court found that those cases rejected statements as
excited utterances because the court strictly enforced the third
element of excited utterances doctrine, requiring that the statement
relate to the startling occurrence.1 4 Second, these cases improperly
required that excited utterances be a "continuing part of the trans-
action," inextricably intertwined with the crime being prosecuted.1 5
For the same reasons articulated in subsection II.A.l.a., the
courts in Keefe and WC.L. improperly relied on old res gestae
rationales in excluding these statements because the declarant's
stress was not continuous between the underlying offense and the
victim's statements. For the same reasons cited in subsection
II.A.1.a., these courts failed to even consider the rationales for
applying the excited utterance exception more liberally when the
declarant is a child. Furthermore, these courts never explained
where these four-year-old declarants would have learned these
sexual positions if not through sexual abuse.316
The final point which distinguishes these cases from those in the
prior subsection is that these cases also excluded the declarants'
statements because, as noted in Bayne, they did not sufficiently
'relate to' the original crime. 317 For instance, in Keefe, the court
excluded the declarant's statements because "they were an attempt
at an excuse for an entirely independent incident, occurring a number
of days after the alleged crime could have been committed. 3 8
Initially, the court's analysis was fallacious because the third prong
of the excited utterance exception requires that the statement relate
312. See supra notes 212, 299-301 and accompanying text.
313. Bayne, 632 A.2d at 489.
314. Id. at 484-85.
315. Id. at 484.
316. See supra notes 299-301 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
318. Keefe v. State, 72 P.2d 425, 428 (Ariz. 1937). Interestingly, in the previously cited case
of Glover v. State, 102 S.W.3d 754, 764 (Tex. App. 2002), a Texas court noted that it was
excluding a victim's statements because they were made in response to questioning
"calculated to elicit a confession," distinguishing the case from Hunt v. State, 904 S.W.2d 813
(Tex. App. 1995), a Texas case in which the questioning was perceived as "independent" from
the original crime at issue. Neither formalistic approach, however, seems entirely appropriate
because it is the effect on the declarant, and not the dependence or independence of the
subsequent startling occurrence, that should determine admissibility. See supra notes 83-84
and accompanying text.
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to the startling occurrence, not the underlying crime."' When a
subsequent startling occurrence prompts statements about a prior
crime, courts requiring more than that the statement merely 'relate
to' the prompting startling occurrence have taken two approaches,
both of which would support admitting the statement in Keefe. First,
some courts hold that such statements, made in response to subse-
quent occurrences and about past crimes, could take on a reflective
quality, creating doubt as to whether the declarant's statement was
truly spontaneous. ° Yet, the court in Keefe made it clear that the
victim's statement was made in response to the "shock caused the
children by being found in flagrante delicto, '321 so there was no
question that the statement was made spontaneously after a startling
event. Further, even if there were some question about direct
evidence of spontaneity, both the age of the victim generally, and the
fact that young children lack the detailed knowledge of sexual
behavior necessary to fabricate a story about it, would support.the
proposition that the statement was spontaneous. 2
Second, some courts hold that the statements sought to be
introduced as excited utterances must broadly relate to the
circumstances surrounding an event.323 For instance, in Bondurant
v. State, statements about a murder that had occurred three days
prior to the startling occurrence were.admissible when they were
prompted by the defendant threatening to commit suicide and frame
his girlfriend if she spoke about the murder.2 Under this standard,
it would be difficult for the court to argue that the victim's state-
ments in Keefe about prior sexual abuse did not broadly relate to the
circumstance of being found mimicking sexual positions allegedly
'learned" from that abuse. Again, for the court to defend this
position, it-would have to contradict the generally accepted proposi-
tion that children's statements about sexual abuse are especially
likely to be truthful because a child, particularly a four-year-old
child, is unlikely to have the detailed knowledge about sex to be able
to fabricate a believable story about abuse.325
The only rationale for judges, such as those in Keefe, excluding
these statements for a failure to "relate to" the occurrence preceding
it, is that these judges are relying on the elucidation requirement
that was an element of res gestae, but is not an element of the
319. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
321. 72 P.2d 425, 428 (Ariz. 1937).
322. See supra notes 105-113 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
324. Bondurant v. State, 956 S.W.2d 762, 767 (Tex. App. 1997).
325. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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excited utterance exception."' As previously noted, both the
advisory committee notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence and the
bulk of case law indicate that the 'relate to' requirement of the
excited utterance exception requires much less than-the elucidation
requirement of res gestae or the present sense impression
exception.327 Thus, it seems apparent that courts in cases such as
Keefe and W C.L. are improperly excluding excited utterances based
on the elucidation. requirement of res gestae which is non-existent in
the excited utterance exception.
2. Children Making Excited Utterances in Response to a
Startling Condition Caused by Prior Abuse
The second major mistake courts make in applying the excited
utterance exception is failing to recognize that the exception allows
for the admission of statements made in response to startling
conditions as well as startling events. In State v. Messamore,328 a
three-year-old girl was allegedly raped by her father's friend on May
26th. On June 4th, "after complaining about her fear of urinating,
the child urinated while standing on the stairs.""2 While her mother
was spanking her for urinating on the stairs, "the child related to
her the events of May 26[th].""° The court excluded the statement,
refusing to admit it because it was made ten days after the alleged
rape.331 The court, however, did not even consider whether the
statements could be admitted because they were made while under
the stress of the startling condition of vaginal pain or the event of
being spanked.332 Instead, the court held that because the state-
ments were "made not in response to the actual event in question,
but in response to fear of a spanking for wetting one's pants, an
even stronger case for exclusion [was] shown." '333
In Couchman v. State," however, the Court of Appeals of Texas
admitted statements made by a four-year-old sexual abuse victim
under similar circumstances, affirming the trial court's decision.33
The four-year-old victim was allegedly sexually abused by her
326. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
328. 639 P.2d 413, 416 (Hawaii Ct. Ap'p. 1982).
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 419.
332. Id. at 418-19.
333. Id. at 419.
334. 3 S.W.3d 155 (Tex. App. 1999).
335. Id. at 162.
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mother's boyfriend.3 6 Later, when she was at her father's and aunt's
house, the aunt washed the victim's hair and "instructed her niece
to wash the rest of her body." '337 The girl "became upset and refused
to wash her genital area, saying it hurt and burned."33 When the
aunt asked about the source of her pain, the girl pointed to her
vagina and told the aunt that the boyfriend "had touched her and
stuck his finger inside her."'339
The court rejected the appellant's argument that the victim's
"statements were inadmissible as excited utterances because the
trial court expressly ruled that they were 'too far removed from the
original [offense] to be an excited utterance."'340 The court reached
this conclusion by finding that it did not need to "resort back to the
actual offense ... to find a startling occurrence that would bring
[the victim's] statements under the Rule 803(2) exception. '3 41 The
court found that the girl could have made her statements while
under the stress created by the "burning sensation in her female
sexual organ. 342 Her statements were thus admissible because they
related to the startling condition: they explained the cause of her
genital pain.343
The key to the court's decision was the "plain language of Rule
803(2) .... Under the Rule and state codes of evidence, "either
a startling event or condition may provoke a statement that is
admissible as an excited utterance.3 1 45 The court in Couchman did
not premise its holding on a subsequent startling event rekindling
the stress that had subsided since the offense being prosecuted.
3 41
Instead, the girl's statement was admissible because it was made
about a previous startling event while she was under the stress of
a startling condition - vaginal pain - which resulted from that
previous startling event.347
In some cases, defendants have admitted that a child's vaginal
pain would constitute a startling condition. In State v. Gordon, a
three-year-old girl was allegedly raped, possibly within the previous
twenty-four hours, before crying out in pain while attempting to
336. Id. at 158.
337. Id. at 157.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 158.
340. Id. at 159.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 159-60.
344. Id. at 159.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 159-60.
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urinate.34 Rather than challenging whether this pain was a startling
condition, the defendant conceded "that the pain experienced by
the victim while urinating, as opposed to the sexual offense itself,
constituted a startling event.3 49
When considered, this logic makes sense. If an individual eats
spoiled food at a restaurant and then names where and what she
ate when she begins to feel intestinal pain the next day, her
statements should be admissible as excited utterances whether or
not she is available to testify at trial. If someone falls on a slippery
floor in a store and then begins to feel sharp, shooting pains in her
back a few days later, her statements about the store and its
conditions should be similarly admissible. This being the case, it
seems clear that statements by a rape victim (particularly a child)
should be admissible when her statements are made soon after she
suffers vaginal pain, even if this is separated in time from the
original crime.
It seems indisputable that such pain, especially when suffered
by a child, constitutes a startling condition sufficient to act as the
predicate for an excited utterance. In fact, in at least one case the
defendant has conceded that such a condition qualifies as a startling
condition which could lead to an excited utterance about a prior
event.35 ° Indeed, excluding statements made in response to a
startling condition that relate back to a prior event renders the
language in the Federal Rules of Evidence a nullity. By necessity,
a startling condition must accompany or follow the underlying
offense. A plaintiff who slips on a wet store floor experiences the
startling condition of pain at the same time as the event of her fall
or at some point afterward, the food poisoning victim experiences
the startling condition of intestinal pain after eating, but no
declarant ever experiences a startling condition before the under-
lying offense.351 When a startling condition is contemporaneous with
a startling event, there is no point in separately considering the
condition because the startling event itself is sufficient to prompt an
excited utterance.
Thus, the only time that the language "or condition" becomes
meaningful is when a startling condition occurs after the stress from
the underlying startling event has subsided.352 Thus, even if courts
348. 952 S.W.2d 817 (Tenn. 1997).
349. Id. at 821.
350. Id. ('The State contends, and the defendant concedes, that the pain experienced by the
victim while urinating, as opposed to the sexual offense itself, constituted a startling event.").
351. Perhaps under some bizarre factual scenario, a startling condition could precede the
underlying offense, but this author was unable to find such a case.
352. Again, there could potentially be some factual scenario where this would not be the
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were justified in excluding statements made in response to subse-
quent startling events, there appears to be no justification for
excluding statements made in response to startling conditions
simply because those conditions do not coincide with the original
startling event. Critics may argue that a distinction should be
drawn between cases such as food poisoning, where the event is not
revealed to be startling until the startling condition later occurs,
and cases such as rape, where the rape is known to be startling even
before subsequent vaginal pain. The inquiry should be, however,
whether the subsequent occurrence was startling to the declarant,
not whether anything prior to that occurrence excludes the
declarant's statements as excited utterances. Thus, the fact that the
underlying offense was initially startling should have no bearing
when the court determines that a subsequent condition resulting
from that offense is sufficiently startling to still the declarant's
reflective capacity.
3. Adults Making Excited Utterances in Response to Subsequent
Startling Occurrences
As part of the general trend to apply the excited utterance
elements more liberally for child sexual abuse victims but not for
adult rape victims, every case this author found allowing excited
utterances following subsequent startling occurrences in rape and
sexual assault cases involved child, and not adult, victims. Nonethe-
less, even if the theory proposed about Rape Trauma Syndrome353
putting adult rape victims in the same position as child rape victims
is not accepted, there should still be no reason to exclude statements
made by adult rape victims in response to subsequent startling
occurrences. Again, the only reasons courts have given to exclude
such statements in child sexual abuse cases have been vestiges of
res gestae. Thus, for instance, if an adult rape victim unexpectedly
runs into her assailant weeks after the offense, there should be no
reason to exclude her emotional statement about the offense despite
the lapse in time, as long as the statement is made while she is
under the stress of the subsequent startling occurrence. The only
question in such a case would be whether the statement was, in fact,
spontaneous,354 and scholars have noted that when the underlying
case. For instance, possibly an otherwise non-startling crime could cause a simultaneous
startling condition which would form the predicate for an excited utterance. However, the
author found no such cases.
353. See generally supra notes 149-150 and accompanying text.
354. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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crime is especially stressful, as is certainly the case with rape and
sexual assault, the declarant is more susceptible to renewed stress
from subsequent, related events. 35 '5 Thus, in cases involving adult
sexual abuse victims, it follows that a victim's statements should be
admitted as excited utterances when the victim is exposed to a
subsequent startling occurrence.
CONCLUSION
While the vast majority of the attention in rape jurisprudence
has been focused on the rape shield laws and the laws allowing the
admission of evidence of prior sexual offenses against a defendant
charged with rape or sexual assault, a sharp conflict has arisen
among courts over whether and when subsequent startling occur-
rences can form the predicates for excited utterances. While some
courts properly admit statements made in response to such occur-
rences based on evidence of their effect on declarants, other courts
incorrectly exclude such statements based on the vestiges of res
gestae and misinterpretations of the excited utterance exception.
Moreover, most courts have only considered this situation when the
declarant is a child and exclude statements under similar circum-
stances when the rape victim is an adult. When the reasoning behind
the excited utterance exception is properly applied, however, it
becomes apparent that subsequent startling occurrences should
stand on the same legal ground as underlying startling occurrences.
If the court believes that either an underlying or a subsequent
occurrence is startling to the declarant, the declarant's statements
made spontaneously while controlled by the stress of that occurrence
should be admissible.
355. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 267, § 507 (1980).
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